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I.  Introduction 
The International Criminal Court (“ICC”) is a unique 
institution.  It is the first and the only permanent international 
criminal court with prospective jurisdiction over “the most serious 
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole,” 
namely genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and 
aggression.1  Unlike its predecessors, the post-Second World War 
International Military Tribunals for Nuremberg and the Far East 
(“IMTs”)2  and the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals for the 
Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (ad hoc tribunals; “ICTY”, 
“ICTR”),3 the ICC was established on the basis of a widely 
negotiated multilateral treaty: the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (“Rome Statute”).4  The Rome Statute was the 
product of intense negotiations, involving representatives of a 
large number of States, as well as many international and non-
governmental organizations.5  The negotiations resulted in a 
statutory framework that departs in significant ways from any 
other international criminal justice institution, past or present, and 
from the characteristics of any particular domestic legal system. 
Despite its unique features, many of the issues that the ICC has 
come to address, and will consider in future years, have already 
been adjudicated by other judicial institutions.  These institutions 
include not only other international and internationalized criminal 
tribunals and domestic criminal courts, but also mechanisms that 
 
 1 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 5, Jul. 17, 1998, 2187 
UNTS 3 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
 2 The International Military Tribunal for Nuremberg was established by agreement 
of the four major Allied powers – France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the 
United States.  The International Military Tribunal was established pursuant to a special 
proclamation by General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied 
Powers in Japan.  See Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Annex to the 
Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the 
European Axis art. 22, Aug. 8, 1945, 251 UNTS 280; see also Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Jan. 16, 1946. 
 3 The ad hoc tribunals were established pursuant to resolutions of the United 
Nations Security Council.  See S. C. Res. 827, S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993); S. C. Res. 
955, S/RES/955 (November 8, 1994). 
 4 Rome Statute, supra note 1. 
 5 A total of 160 states, 33 intergovernmental organizations and 236 non-
governmental organizations participated in the negotiations.  See Mahnoush H. 
Arsanjani, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 22, 
22 (1999). 
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deal with State as opposed to individual responsibility, such as 
regional human rights courts and the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ).  Parallels in the issues of law and fact addressed by the ICC 
and other institutions create significant scope for “judicial cross-
referencing,” including the practice whereby judges refer to and 
draw from external case law in their decision-making.6 
While the proliferation of international courts and tribunals has 
prompted a growing body of research into judicial interaction at 
the international level, understanding of the nature and scope of 
the practice remains limited.7  This is particularly so in relation to 
the ICC, which has been operating for a relatively short period of 
time, having commenced operation in 2002 and delivered its first 
judgment in 2012.8  Research into the use of external case law by 
the ICC and other international criminal courts and tribunals has 
tended to focus on the use of external case law from particular 
institutions or in relation to specific legal issues.9  Where research 
has looked to the use of external jurisprudence from a range of 
institutions without focusing on specific norms, it has concentrated 
 
 6 Throughout this article the term “precedent,” which is sometimes used in this 
context, has been avoided due to its connotations in domestic legal systems.  For 
discussion, see Nathan Miller, An International Jurisprudence? The Operation of 
Precedent Across International Tribunals, 15(3) LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 483, 488-89 (2002) 
[hereinafter Miller].  The term “dialogue” has also been avoided on the basis that it 
presupposes a two-way or multi-way exchange, when the cross-referencing may only be 
in one direction.  For the purposes of this article, “judicial cross-referencing” is 
conceptualized and discussed as a form of judicial interaction that is revealed, in part, 
through the citation of external case law in judicial decisions. 
 7 For acknowledgment of the paucity of research on this issue, see Triestino 
Mariniello & Paolo Lobba, The Cross-Fertilisation Rhetoric in Question: Use and Abuse 
of the European Court’s Jurisprudence by International Criminal Tribunals, 84 NORDIC 
J. INT’L L. 363, 364 (2015). 
 8 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, Judgment Pursuant to 
Article 74 of the Statute (Mar. 14, 2012) [hereinafter Lubanga]. 
 9 See, e.g., Antonio Cassese, The Influence of the European Court of Human 
Rights on International Criminal Tribunals: Some Methodological Remarks, in HUM. 
RTS. AND CRIM. JUST. FOR THE DOWNTRODDEN: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ASBJØRN EIDE 
(Morten Bergsmo ed., 2003) [hereinafter Cassese]; Erik Voeten, Borrowing and 
Nonborrowing among International Courts, 39(2) J. LEGAL STUD. 547 (2010); Nicolas 
A. J. Croquet, The International Criminal Court and the Treatment of Defence Rights: A 
Mirror of the European Court of Human Rights’ Jurisprudence?, 11(1) HUM. RTS. L. 
REV. 91 (2011); Olivier de Frouville, The Influence of the European Court of Human 
Rights’ Case Law on International Criminal Law of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment, 9(3) J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 633 (2011) [hereinafter de Frouville]; Philippa 
Webb,  INT’L JUD. INTEGRATION & FRAGMENTATION (2013) [hereinafter Webb]. 
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on final judgments produced by the relevant trial chambers.10  This 
is problematic, given the range of issues that are addressed 
throughout the course of the criminal justice process that are not 
discussed in the trial chamber’s final judgment on guilt or 
innocence of the accused. 
Academic discussion of the significance of judicial cross-
referencing is also limited in focus.  A significant proportion of the 
existing literature on judicial cross-referencing at the international 
level has critiqued the practice in light of its implications for the 
coherence of international law.11  The discussion takes place 
against the background of a longstanding debate about the threat of 
fragmentation in international law, part of which arises from the 
proliferation of international courts and tribunals in an 
international legal order with no formal judicial hierarchy.12  The 
range of institutions that have been established to interpret and 
apply international criminal law and related bodies of law makes 
the risk of fragmentation high.  Judges can mitigate this risk by 
engaging in the practice of judicial cross-referencing, thereby 
contributing to the law’s clarity, fairness, and effectiveness.  The 
contribution of judges to the coherence of international law is 
particularly important in the international criminal context, where 
the rights and liberties of individuals are at stake and where the 
law upholds norms that have been recognized as fundamental to 
the international community.13  The predominant focus on 
 
 10 See, e.g., Aldo Zammit Borda, Precedent in International Criminal Courts and 
Tribunals, 2(2) CAMBRIDGE J. INT’L & COMP. L. 287, 291 (2013) [hereinafter Borda].  An 
exception to this can be found in Nathan Miller’s study on the operation of precedent 
across international criminal tribunals, which does not, however, include analysis of the 
case law of the ICC.  See MILLER, supra note 6, at 483. 
 11 See, e.g., Miller, supra note 6, at 483; Carsten Stahn & Larissa van den Herik, 
“Fragmentation,” Diversification and “3D” Legal Pluralism: International Criminal 
Law as the Jack-in-the-Box, DIVERSIFICATION & FRAGMENTATION INT’L CRIM. L. 25 
(Carsten Stahn & Larissa van den Herik eds., 2012); Webb, supra note 9, at 4-9. 
 12 For discussion of the threat of fragmentation in international law, see 
Symposium in 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 679 (1999); Symposium in 25 MICH. J. INT’L 
L. (2003-2004); Martti Koskenniemi & Päivi Leino, Fragmentation in International 
Law? Postmodern Anxieties, 15 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 533 (2002); Jonathan I. Charney, Is 
International Law Threatened by Multiple International Tribunals?, 271 RECUEIL DES 
COURS 101 (Martinus Nijhoff 1998).  See also Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of 
Its Fifty-Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (2006) [hereinafter ILC 
Fragmentation Report]. 
 13 The ICC’s applicable law encompasses, or relates to, a number of norms that 
have been widely recognized as having jus cogens status, including the prohibition of 
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coherence, however, overlooks the numerous ways in which 
judicial cross-referencing can shape the identity of the referring 
institution, for example by affecting its legitimacy, the fairness of 
its proceedings, and the level of cultural bias that can be found in 
its applicable law.14 
Against this background, this article offers a more 
comprehensive understanding of the ICC’s approach to judicial 
cross-referencing than can be found in existing studies by 
providing qualitative and quantitative content analysis of 406 
decisions produced over the course of a complete trial at the ICC.  
It focuses on the first case to be completed by the ICC: the case of 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (the Lubanga case).15  The 
analysis reveals the approach of judges from the Court’s three 
divisions—the Pre-Trial, Trial and Appeals Chambers—to 
external case law across a wide range of substantive and 
procedural issues over a 10 year period, from the decision of the 
Pre-Trial Chamber authorizing an arrest warrant in February 2006 
to the decision of the Trial Chamber approving and ordering the 
implementation of a plan for collective reparations in October 
2016.  The analysis provides a foundation to consider the 
implications of the ICC’s approach for various aspects of the 
Court’s identity. 
The Lubanga case is a foundational case for the ICC.  It 
stemmed from the ICC’s investigation into the situation in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo and concerned the former 
President of the Hema ethnic group Union des Patriotes Congolese 
and commander of its military wing, the Forces Patriotiques pour 
la Libération du Congo (“FPLC”): Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo.  
The accused was charged, as a co-perpetrator, with the 
 
aggressive use of force; the prohibition of genocide; the prohibition of torture, crimes 
against humanity; the prohibition of slavery and slave trade; the prohibition of racial 
discrimination and apartheid; the prohibition of hostilities directed at the civilian 
population (basic rules of international humanitarian law).  See ILC Fragmentation 
Report, supra note 12 at ¶ 374. 
 14 Some studies have addressed the relationship between judicial cross-referencing 
and the fairness of international criminal proceedings.  See Cassese, supra note 9; Aldo 
Zammit Borda, Appraisal-Based and Flexible Approaches to External Precedent in 
International Criminal Law, 28 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 643, 643 (2015). 
 15 The number of decisions includes annexes and separate and dissenting opinions 
where they appeared in separate Court documents.  The decisions referred to were those 
available through the ICC’s Legal Tools Database on July 20, 2016. 
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conscription, enlistment and use of child soldiers as war crimes 
under Article 8 of the Rome Statute.  The trial ended with a guilty 
verdict in 2012, and the imposition of a sentence of fourteen years 
imprisonment, both of which were confirmed on appeal in 
December 2014.  The Appeals Chamber amended the Trial 
Chamber’s order for reparations in March 2015, and a plan for 
symbolic collective reparations was approved in October 2016. 
The narrow range of charges that formed the basis of the 
Court’s first case was controversial in light of allegations that the 
armed group under the command of Mr. Lubanga had committed 
other crimes, including mass murder, rape, mutilation, and 
torture.16  Nonetheless, the range of issues addressed by the Court 
throughout the proceedings was considerable.17  The judges were 
tasked with bringing to life the ICC’s unique procedural 
framework and shedding light on various aspects of it, including 
controversial issues such as the parameters of victim participation 
in the Court’s proceedings.  They implemented the ICC’s 
provisions on sentencing and reparations for the first time and 
addressed issues relating to the admissibility of cases to the Court.  
In addition to the elaboration of Article 8 of the Rome Statute and 
the specific war crimes charged, the judges shed light on the 
meaning and scope of the ICC’s modes of liability and other 
general principles of law outlined in Part III of the Rome Statute.  
In doing so, the judges established a foundation of judicial 
reasoning onto which later cases built.  The Lubanga case law has 
been referred to and relied upon frequently in subsequent cases 
before the Court, in accordance with Article 21(2) of the Rome 
Statute.18  In this respect, the Lubanga case has had a considerable 
influence on the ICC’s applicable law and holds significance 
beyond the historical insights that it offers into judicial interaction 
in the formative years of a new international judicial institution. 
 
 16 Triestino Mariniello, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo: The First Judgment 
of the International Criminal Court’s Trial Chamber, 1 INT’L HUM. RTS. L. REV. 137, 
141 (2012). 
 17 For discussion of issues raised in the Lubanga proceedings, see Diane Marie 
Amann, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 809 (2012); see also Kai Ambos, 
The First Judgment of the International Criminal Court (Prosecutor v. Lubanga): A 
Comprehensive Analysis of the Legal Issues, 12 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 115 (2012); 
Mariniello, supra note 16. 
 18 Article 21(2) of the Rome Statute allows the Court to “apply principles and rules 
of law as interpreted in its previous decisions.”  Rome Statute, supra note 1. 
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The Lubanga case law reveals a Court that is operating in 
many respects as a continuation, rather than a rupture, of wider 
international (criminal) law.  The decisions of other courts and 
tribunals have been used to elaborate on aspects of the ICC’s 
applicable law across a range of legal issues.  The approach that 
the judges have taken has contributed to the coherence of 
international law within and beyond the specialized branch of 
international criminal law, providing further evidence of the 
important role that judges are playing in mitigating the risk of 
international law’s fragmentation.  It has raised issues regarding 
various aspects of the Court’s identity, however, including its 
legitimacy, fairness and cultural bias.  A key concern is the lack of 
reasoning that the judges have offered as to the weight that has 
been given to external jurisprudence in the Court’s decisions and 
the basis for referring to it under the ICC’s rules of applicable law 
and interpretation.  The Lubanga case law indicates the need for 
much clearer judicial reasoning, as well as continued efforts to 
enhance geographical representation in the staffing of the ICC and 
to increase the accessibility of international case law. 
The remainder of the article is divided into six sections.  
Sections II and III discuss the scope for judicial cross-referencing 
at the ICC and its legal basis in the Court’s rules of applicable law 
and interpretation.  Section IV presents content analysis of the 
ICC’s approach to external jurisprudence in the Lubanga case.  
Section V explores the implications of the practice for various 
aspects of the Court’s identity.  Section VI proposes ways in 
which the detrimental effects of judicial cross-referencing for the 
ICC’s legitimacy, fairness, and cultural bias can be addressed. 
II. The Scope for Judicial Cross-Referencing at the ICC 
Overlap in the law applied by different judicial bodies provides 
a practical foundation for judicial cross-referencing.  In the field of 
international criminal law, the scope for judicial cross-referencing 
is vast.  This broad scope is due to the number of judicial 
institutions that have been established to hold individuals 
responsible for the commission of international crimes,19 as well as 
 
 19 Burke-White has identified a “community of courts” concerned with the 
enforcement of international criminal law.  See William W. Burke-White, A Community 
of Courts: Toward a System of International Criminal Law Enforcement, 24 MICH. J. 
INT’L L. 1 (2002). 
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the relationship between international criminal law and other 
bodies of law that have their own judicial mechanisms, including 
international human rights law and domestic criminal law. 
The closest relatives to the ICC in terms of their applicable law 
and function are the international criminal tribunals that preceded 
the Court’s establishment, the post-Second World War IMTs, and 
the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.  
These institutions were tasked with interpreting and applying 
international criminal law at its embryonic stage and, in doing so, 
made significant contributions to the law’s elaboration and 
progressive development.20  In many respects, the Rome Statute 
builds upon the experience of the ad hoc tribunals and the IMTs.21  
Their decisions provide an obvious point of reference for the 
judges of the ICC. 
While there is considerable overlap between the applicable law 
of the ICC, the IMTs, and the ad hoc tribunals, the negotiation of 
the Rome Statute also resulted in some significant distinctions.  
One example can be found in the definition of crimes against 
humanity under Article 7 of the Rome Statute, which introduces a 
new requirement that the conduct of the accused is committed as 
part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian 
population “pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or 
organizational policy to commit such attack.”22  The ICC’s modes 
of liability, outlined in Article 25 of the Rome Statute, also depart 
from those applied by the ad hoc tribunals, in particular by 
excluding some of the broader and more heavily contested aspects 
 
 20 On judicial creativity and progressive development of the law by the judges of 
the ad hoc tribunals, see Susan Lamb, Nullum Crimen, Nulla Poena Sine Lege in 
International Criminal Law, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INT’L CRIM. CT., VOL. IB 733, 
742-46 (A. Cassese et al. eds., 2002); see Allison Marston Danner, When Courts Make 
Law: How the International Criminal Tribunals Recast the Laws of War, 59 VAND. L. 
REV. 1, 25-33 (2006); William A. Schabas, Customary or Judge-Made Law: Judicial 
Creativity at the UN Criminal Tribunals, in THE LEGAL REGIME OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF PROFESSOR IGOR BLISHCHENKO: IN MEMORIAM 
(José Doria et al. eds., 2009); Shane Darcy & Joseph Powderly, JUDICIAL CREATIVITY AT 
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS (2010). 
 21 Danner, supra note 20 at 34-35. 
 22 Rome Statute, supra note 1, at Article 7(2)(a).  For discussion, see David Hunt, 
The International Criminal Court: High Hopes, ‘Creative Ambiguity’ and an 
Unfortunate Mistrust in International Judges, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. L. 56, 64-65 (2004) 
[hereinafter Hunt]. 
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of their doctrine of joint criminal enterprise.23  Distinctions in the 
applicable law of the ICC, the IMTs, and the ad hoc tribunals can 
also be found in elements of the ICC’s procedural framework.  
Notable examples include the provision for victim participation in 
proceedings at the ICC and the establishment of Pre-Trial 
Chambers to filter cases through to trial.24  The ICC’s procedural 
framework also reflects a greater synthesis of common law and 
civil law influences than those of the ad hoc tribunals and the 
IMTs, which drew largely from the common law legal tradition.25  
Such distinctions will provide justification for, and in some 
respects require, the judges of the ICC to address issues in a 
manner that departs from the reasoning of its predecessors. 
Alongside the international criminal courts and tribunals, a 
number of internationalized, or “hybrid,” criminal justice 
mechanisms have been established to hold individuals accountable 
for international crimes committed in particular situations.26  
Examples include the Special Court for Sierra Leone (“SCSL”), 
the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (“ECCC”), 
and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (“STL”).  Many of these 
institutions have made important contributions to the elaboration 
of international criminal law and have addressed issues that have 
not been dealt with expressly, or at length, by their international 
counterparts.  The most relevant source of case law on the 
conscription, enlistment, and use of child soldiers in the Lubanga 
case, for example, came from the SCSL, which had already 
applied similar provisions in the context of the civil war in Sierra 
 
 23 Jens David Ohlin, Joint Criminal Confusion, 12 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 406 (2009). 
 24 Victim participation is provided for under Article 68(3) of the Rome Statute.  
Rome Statute, supra note 1 at Art. 68(3).  The functions and powers of the Pre-Trial 
Chambers are outlined in Article 57 of the Rome Statute.  
 25 Claus Kress, The Procedural Law of the International Criminal Court in 
Outline: Anatomy of a Unique Compromise, 1 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 603, 605 (2003) 
[hereinafter Kress]. 
 26 See Laura Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 295 
(2003) (For discussion of the nature and function of internationalized criminal tribunals 
generally); Lindsey Raub, Positioning Hybrid Tribunals in International Criminal 
Justice, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1013 (2009). Parinaz Kermani Mendez, The New 
Wave of Hybrid Tribunals: A Sophisticated Approach to Enforcing International 
Humanitarian Law or an Idealistic Solution with Empty Promises?, 20 CRIM. LAW 
FORUM 53 (2009); Padraig McAuliffe, Hybrid Tribunals at Ten: How International 
Criminal Justice’s Golden Child Became an Orphan, 7 J. INT’L LAW & INT’L RELATIONS 
1 (2011). 
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Leone.27 
One of the defining features of internationalized criminal 
tribunals is their mix of international and domestic elements in 
their applicable law and personnel.  The ability to synthesize 
elements of international and domestic law in response to the 
peculiarities of the situation at hand makes internationalized 
tribunals a useful, flexible mechanism for responding to 
international crimes.  Despite considerable variation in their 
applicable law, many of the constitutive instruments of 
internationalized tribunals mimic provisions of the Rome Statute 
of the ICC.28  Where parallels in their applicable law can be found, 
avenues open for judicial cross-referencing. 
Another important element of the ICC’s judicial network is 
formed by domestic criminal courts.  While domestic prosecutions 
for international crimes have historically been sparse,29 the 
establishment of international mechanisms has encouraged the 
pursuit of international criminal justice at the domestic level, and 
with it, a growing body of domestic case law involving the 
interpretation and application of international crimes.  This body 
of case law will continue to expand under the ICC’s system of 
complementarity, which gives priority to domestic courts in the 
investigation and prosecution of the ICC’s crimes.30  The Rome 
Statute does not place an obligation on State Parties to investigate 
and prosecute international crimes, but offers them an incentive for 
doing so–the ability to avoid the exercise of the ICC’s jurisdiction 
in relation to their territory and nationals.31  Nonetheless, the 
 
 27 See Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara and Kanu, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T-613, 
Judgment (Jun. 20, 2007); Prosecutor v. Fofana and Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T-
785, Judgment (Aug. 2, 2007); Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara and Kanu, Case No. SCSL-
04-16-A-675, Judgment (Feb. 22, 2008); Prosecutor v. Fofana and Kondewa, Case No. 
SCSL-04-14-A-829, Judgment (May 28, 2008). 
 28 Annika Jones, Tailoring Justice for Mass Atrocities: The Constraints of 
International Law and the ICC’s Complementarity Regime, INT’L L. & POST-CONFLICT 
RECONSTRUCTION POL’Y 95, 111 (Matthew Saul & James Sweeney eds., 2015). 
 29 See Antonio Cassese, On the Current Trends Towards Criminal Prosecution and 
Punishment of Breaches of International Humanitarian Law, 9 EUR. J. INT’L L. 2, 5–7 
(1998) (explaining that: “a state is generally reluctant to prosecute its own personnel”; 
prosecution of enemy personnel risks “exposing war crimes committed by the state’s 
own personnel”; other domestic and international political considerations; and “the 
frequent difficulty of collecting evidence”). 
 30 Rome Statute, supra note 1, at arts. 1 and 17. 
 31 Id. at art. 17(1) (providing that cases that have been addressed at the domestic 
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adoption of the Rome Statute has prompted many States to adopt 
legislation implementing the ICC’s crimes into domestic law, 
some using the definitions of crimes as they stand in the Rome 
Statute, others using narrower or more expansive definitions.32 
Domestic case law has relevance to the ICC’s proceedings 
beyond discussion of the nature and scope of international crimes.  
Many aspects of the Rome Statute, including its procedural rules 
and general principles of law, have been derived from rules and 
principles found in domestic legal systems.  However, the 
domestic rules and principles that are reflected in the Rome Statute 
have been assimilated and modified for use at the international 
level.33  Consequently, while domestic case law is a logical 
reference point for the judges of the ICC, the unique 
characteristics of the ICC’s system of justice must be considered 
before any legal transfers are made. 
Another important source of case law comes from judicial 
institutions that concern the responsibility of States, rather than 
individuals.  These institutions include a range of regional human 
rights courts that have dealt with a variety of related issues, from 
the nature and scope of serious human rights violations that may 
amount to international crimes (such as torture, apartheid and 
enslavement), to the rights of the accused and the rights of victims 
of serious human rights violations (such as the right to 
reparations).  The ICJ has delivered judgments on relevant issues 
of State compliance with international human rights law, 
international humanitarian law, and the law on the use of force.  It 
has also developed a body of advisory opinions on issues of 
pertinence to the ICC.  Recourse to the ICJ’s advisory jurisdiction 
has been proposed as a means of addressing contentious issues at 
the ICC, such as the impact of Head of State immunity on the 
ICC’s proceedings.34  This use of the ICJ’s advisory jurisdiction 
 
level are not admissible at the ICC unless there is evidence of unwillingness or inability 
to oversee genuine proceedings). 
 32 See Jann K. Kleffner, The Impact of Complementarity on National 
Implementation of Substantive International Criminal Law, 1 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. I 86, 
87 (2003); Julio Bacio Terracino, National Implementation of ICC Crimes: Impact on 
National Jurisdictions and the ICC, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 421 (2007). 
 33 See Kress, supra note 25,Error! Bookmark not defined. at 604-05 (discussing 
the relationship between the ICC’s procedural law and domestic legal traditions). 
 34 See Assembly of the African Union, Decision on the Implementation of the 
Decisions on the International Criminal Court (ICC), Assembly/AU/Dec.419(XIX).  The 
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would provide a strong basis for judicial cross-referencing and 
transfer of reasoning from the ICJ to the ICC.  When referring to 
case law from the ICJ and regional human rights courts, the ICC’s 
judges must, of course, remain conscious of the focus of these 
institutions on civil responsibility, as opposed to criminal, which 
may call into question the appropriateness of drawing from their 
reasoning on certain issues. 
While the ad hoc tribunals have come to the end of their 
operation, many of the other judicial institutions referred to above 
will continue to operate alongside the ICC.  Several may even 
operate alongside the ICC in respect of the same factual situations, 
given the ICC’s principle of complementarity and the potential for 
seeking individual and State responsibility for serious violations of 
human rights and international humanitarian law.  The nature and 
scope of the ICC’s engagement with external case law will, 
therefore, retain significance beyond the initial years of the Court’s 
operation.  This is particularly so in light of the recognition in 
Article 10 of the Rome Statute that nothing in Part II of the Rome 
Statute, on Jurisdiction, Admissibility, and Applicable Law, “shall 
be interpreted as limiting or prejudicing in any way existing or 
developing rules of international law for purposes other than [the] 
Statute.”  Article 10 acknowledges that the law beyond the Rome 
Statute will continue to evolve over time, which may give rise to 
further disparities between the provisions of the Rome Statute and 
wider international law in addition to those that have been noted 
above. 
The legal basis for ICC judges to refer to and draw from 
external jurisprudence is determined by the Court’s rules of 
applicable law and interpretation.  While those rules provide a 
foundation for judicial cross-referencing at the ICC, they leave 
various aspects of the Court’s relationship with external case law 
unclear. 
 
Assembly of the African Union has requested the Commission to “undertake further 
study on the advisability and implications of seeking [an] advisory opinion” from the ICJ 
on the question of immunities, under international law, of Heads of State and senior state 
officials from States that are not Parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC. See also Dapo 
Akande, The African Union’s Response to the ICC’s Decisions on Bashir’s Immunity: 
Will the ICJ Get Another Immunity Case?, EJIL: TALK! (Feb. 8, 2012) 
[https://perma.cc/7Y8E-69FK]; Dapo Akande, International Court of Justice Advisory 
Opinion on the ICC Head of State Immunity Issue, EJIL: TALK! (Mar. 31, 2016) 
[https://perma.cc/2ASK-MUUV]. 
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III. A Foundation for Interaction: the ICC’S Rules of 
Applicable Law and Interpretation 
Article 21 of the Rome Statute, which outlines the ICC’s 
sources of applicable law, allows the Court to “apply principles 
and rules of law as interpreted in its [own] previous decisions.”35 It 
makes no reference, however, to the case law of other courts and 
tribunals. 
The absence of a general reference to judicial decisions 
distinguishes the sources of law outlined in Article 21 of the Rome 
Statute from those found in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice, which recognizes a role for judicial 
decisions as “subsidiary means for the determination of rules of 
law.”36  The approach to judicial decisions in Article 21 is at odds 
with the contribution that judges have made to the elaboration of 
international criminal law since the end of the Second World War. 
This approach is understandable, however, amid ongoing 
reluctance to formally recognize the role that judges play in 
international law’s development and specific concerns about 
judicial activism in a branch of international law that addresses the 
criminal responsibility of individuals.37 
Not only does Article 21 fail to include a general reference to 
external case law, its first paragraph limits opportunities to draw 
from it by creating a hierarchy of sources that prioritizes the 
detailed provisions of the Rome Statute, together with the ICC’s 
Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence, over 
other sources of applicable law.  The structure and content of 
Article 21(1), together with the level of detail throughout the 
Rome Statute, has been criticized for sacrificing judicial creativity 
in the interests of reassuring States and encouraging widespread 
ratification.38 
Article 21(1) allows the Court to apply: 
 
 
 35 Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 21(2). 
 36 Statute of the International Court of Justice, art 38(1)(d), Jun. 26, 1945, 33 
UNTS 933 [hereinafter ICJ Statute]. 
 37 Salvatore Zappalà, Judicial Activism v. Judicial Restraint in International 
Criminal Justice, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO INT’L CRIM. JUST. 216, 217 (Antonio 
Cassese et al. eds., 2009). 
 38 Hunt, supra note 22; see also Robert Cryer, Royalism and the King: Article 21 of 
the Rome Statute and the Politics of Sources, 12 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 390 (2009). 
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a. In the first place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence; 
 
b. In the second place, where appropriate, applicable treaties and 
the principles and rules of international law, including the 
established principles of the international law of armed conflict; 
 
c. Failing that, general principles of law derived by the Court 
from national laws of legal systems of the world including, as 
appropriate, the national laws of States that would normally 
exercise jurisdiction over the crime, provided that those 
principles are not inconsistent with this Statute and with 
international law and internationally recognized norms and 
standards. 
 
Despite the above, the text of Article 21(1) creates several 
openings for reference to external jurisprudence, which provide a 
legal basis for judicial cross-referencing at the ICC.  The first 
opening is found in Article 21(1)(a).  Case law provides an 
obvious source of assistance in the interpretation of the Rome 
Statute and its accompanying texts.  The rules governing the 
interpretation of the Rome Statute are found in Articles 31-32 of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) (“VCLT”).39  
External case law may be used by the judges to help determine the 
ordinary meaning of the terms of the treaty, which is the focus of 
the general rule of interpretation set out in Article 31(1) of the 
VCLT,40 either by indicating the “functional” meaning of terms in 
the Rome Statute, or by shedding light on the meaning and scope 
of “generic” terms that are intended to evolve over time in 
accordance with developments in wider international law.41 
 
 39 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 22, 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 
[hereinafter VCLT]; see Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Case No. 
ICC-01/04-168, Judgment on the Prosecutor’s Application for Extraordinary Review of 
Pre-Trial Chamber I’s 31 March 2006 Decision Denying Leave to Appeal (Jul. 13, 
2006), ¶ 33; see also William A. Schabas, THE INT’L CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 
ON THE ROME STATUTE 388 (2010). 
 40 VCLT, supra note 39, at art. 31(1) (requiring that the treaty is interpreted “in 
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty 
in their context and in the light of its object and purpose”). 
 41 See RICHARD GARDINER, TREATY INTERPRETATION 186-87, 192-93 (2d ed. 2015) 
(discussing “functional meaning” of treaty terms and “generic terms”). 
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Perhaps the most obvious opening for reference to external 
case law under the VCLT is Article 31(3)(c), which requires the 
interpreter to take into account, together with the context, “[a]ny 
relevant rules of international law applicable in relations between 
the parties.”  The provision has been understood to provide 
“express justification for looking outside the four corners of a 
particular treaty to its place in the broader framework of 
international law.”42  There are, however, difficulties in using this 
provision as a basis for referring to external case law in the context 
of the Rome Statute.43  The first is that it is unclear as to which 
“rules of international law” Article 31(3)(c) reference.  In the 
context of the Rome Statute, it would be logical to refer to the 
sources that are outlined in Article 21(1)(b) and (c).  However, as 
discussed below, these provisions do not provide a clear basis for 
reference to judicially created rules or principles that do not have 
their basis in custom or general principles of law.  A conservative 
interpretation would suggest that Article 31(3)(c) offers a basis for 
reference to external jurisprudence only insofar as it sheds light on 
customary rules and general principles of law. 
A further issue raised by Article 31(3)(c) is the reference to 
rules that are “applicable in relations between the parties.”  It is 
not clear what “the parties” are in the context of the Rome 
Statute—parties to the Rome Statute or parties to the proceedings 
before the Court.44  The former would be more appropriate as a 
matter of policy, given that the latter would allow for inconstant 
approaches to be taken in different cases before the ICC.  The 
“fragmentation” that would follow would be problematic for 
reasons that are discussed further below.45  Interpreting Article 
31(3)(c) as a reference to rules that are applicable in relation to the 
 
 42 Campbell McLachlan, The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31(3)(c) 
of the Vienna Convention, 54 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 279, 281 (2005). 
 43 See Mélanie Samson, High Hopes, Scant Resources: A Word of Scepticism about 
the Anti-Fragmentation Function of Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, 24 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 701 (2011) (discussing the role of Article 31(3)(c) 
in resisting the fragmentation of international law). 
 44 See Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO 
Law Relates to Other Rules of International Law (2003) (discussing the meaning of the 
“parties” under Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT); Ulf Linderfalk, Who Are ‘The Parties’? 
Article 31, Paragraph 3(C) of the 1969 Vienna Convention and the ‘Principle of 
Systemic Integration’ Revisited, 55 NETHERLANDS INT’L L. REV. 343 (2008). 
 45 See id. at § 5.A. 
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State parties to the Rome Statute would limit the range of rules 
that judges are required to consider as customary international law, 
general principles of law, and treaty rules that have almost 
universal application.  This reinforces the argument that external 
case law would only be relevant under Article 31(3)(c) as guidance 
in the identification and interpretation of a narrow range of rules.  
Consequently, while the rules of interpretation outlined in the 
VCLT provide openings for judicial cross-referencing, they 
provide a limited foundation for the practice. 
Beyond Article 21(1)(a), further openings for judicial cross-
referencing can be found in Article 21(1)(b) and (c).  The phrase 
“principles and rules of international law” in Article 21(1)(b) has 
been understood to refer, at a minimum, to rules of customary 
international law.46  Under this interpretation, the decisions of 
domestic courts are relevant as a source of State practice or opinio 
juris in the formation of customary rules.  The decisions of both 
international and domestic courts are relevant for their previous 
assessments of the status of customary international law.47  While 
some have understood the phrase “principles and rules of 
international law” to refer exclusively to international custom,48 it 
has also been argued that “certain principles of international 
criminal law, as have been occasionally identified by the ICTY, 
may be subsumed under this term.”49  This is significant insofar as 
 
 46 Volker Nerlich, The Status of ICTY and ICTR Precedent in Proceedings Before 
the ICC, in THE EMERGING PRACTICE OF THE INT’L CRIM. COURT 305, 313 (Carsten Stahn 
& Göran Sluiter eds., 2009) [hereinafter Nerlich]; Margaret McAuliffe deGuzman, 
Article 21: Applicable Law, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE 
INT’L CRIM. COURT: OBSERVER’S NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE, 701, 707-
708 (Otto Triffterer & Kai Ambos eds., 2008); Vladimir-Djuro Degan, On the Sources of 
International Criminal Law, 4 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 45, 80 (2005). 
 47 See Guénaël Mettraux, Int’l Crimes and the Ad Hoc Tribunals, , ch. 2-3 (2010) 
(discussing the ad hoc tribunals’ reliance on customary international law).  See U.N. 
Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security 
Council Resolution 808, ¶ 34, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993).  The Report of the 
Secretary General accompanying the proposed Statute of the ICTY emphasizes that “the 
application of the principle nullum crimen sine lege requires that the international 
tribunal should apply rules of international humanitarian law which are beyond any 
doubt part of customary law so that the problem of adherence of some but not all States 
to specific conventions does not arise.”  Id. 
 48 Alain Pellet, Applicable Law in The Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court: A Commentary, Vol II, 1051, 1071 (Antonio Cassese et al eds., 2002) [hereinafter 
Pellet]. 
 49 Nerlich, supra note 46, at 313.  This comment, however, seems to be 
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it supports the incorporation of a wider array of judicially-
developed rules, including those that form the procedural 
framework of the ad hoc tribunals.  It is unclear, however, what 
“principles of international criminal law” would qualify for 
application under this provision. 
External jurisprudence also plays a role in the identification of 
general principles of law, which are referred to in Article 21(1)(c) 
of the Rome Statute.  The decisions of domestic criminal courts 
are an obvious reference point in deriving general principles from 
“national laws of legal systems of the world.”50  The decisions of 
other regional and international institutions are also significant 
insofar as they contain previously identified general principles that 
can be referred to and used by the judges of the ICC. 
A further avenue for reference to external jurisprudence lies in 
Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute, which requires the application 
and interpretation of the ICC’s sources of applicable law to be 
“consistent with internationally recognized human rights.”  The 
significance of Article 21(3) as a basis for judicial cross-
referencing depends on what is meant by “internationally 
recognized human rights,” and how they are found.  The focus of 
Article 21(3) on human rights that are “internationally recognized” 
raises interesting questions about the relevance of regional human 
rights jurisprudence in their identification.  Another uncertainty 
surrounding Article 21(3) concerns the impact of internationally 
recognized human rights on the sources of law outlined in Article 
21(1) of the Rome Statute, for example in adding rules and 
principles to the ICC’s applicable law, or overriding inconsistent 
aspects of its provisions.51  If interpreted in a manner that allows it 
to override the wording of statutory provisions, Article 21(3)—and 
external jurisprudence as a reference point in identifying 
internationally recognized human rights—could play a significant 
role in shaping the applicable law of the ICC. 
Clearly, ICC judges have numerous tools that they can use to 
 
contradicted by the discussion in later paragraphs, where it is concluded that “decisions 
of the ad hoc tribunals cannot be considered autonomous sources of law for the ICC.”  
Id. at 316. 
 50 Rome Statute, supra note 1Error! Bookmark not defined., at art. 21(1)(c). 
 51 See Pellet, supra note 48, at 1080; Dapo Akande, Sources of International 
Criminal Law, OXFORD COMPANION TO INT’L CRIM. J. 41, 46 (Antonio Cassese ed., 
2009). 
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justify their reference to external case law.  However, the legal 
framework contains ambiguities regarding the scope it provides for 
reference to external jurisprudence and the impact that it can have 
on the Court’s applicable law.  Following the establishment of the 
ICC, the underdeveloped rules governing the ICC’s relationship 
with other courts and tribunals were handed over to the judges of 
the ICC to clarify through their case law.  The first insights into 
the Court’s approach were provided in the case of Prosecutor v. 
Thomas Lubanga Dylio. 
IV. Judicial Cross-Referencing in Practice: the Lubanga 
Case 
On a number of occasions in the Lubanga case, the judges of 
the ICC directly addressed the relevance of external jurisprudence 
in their decision-making.  In an early decision on the practice of 
witness preparation and familiarization, the Chamber stressed that 
precedent of the ad hoc tribunals was “in no sense binding on the 
Trial Chamber” and that it “[did] not consider the procedural rules 
and jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals to be automatically 
applicable to the ICC without detailed analysis.”52  In several other 
decisions, including their final judgment, the Chamber emphasized 
that the decisions of other courts and tribunals are “not part of the 
directly applicable law under Article 21 of the Statute.”53 
While ICC judges have not treated external jurisprudence as 
binding or automatically applicable, they have expressly 
recognized its value as a source of assistance in their decision-
making.  External case law has been deemed relevant, in 
particular, in instances where the wording of the Rome Statute 
coincides with the wording of the statute of another court or 
tribunal,54 where the rules of procedure and evidence of other 
 
 52 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1049, Decision Regarding 
the Practices Used to Prepare and Familiarize Witnesses for Giving Testimony at Trial, ¶ 
44 (Nov. 30, 2007). 
 53 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, Judgment Pursuant to 
Article 74 of the Statute, ¶ 603 (Mar. 14, 2012);  Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-
01/04-01/06-2727, Redacted Decision on the Prosecution’s Application to Admit 
Rebuttal Evidence from Witness DRC-OTP-WWWW-0005, ¶ 41 (Apr. 28, 2011).  
Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2705, Decision on the Defence 
Request to Reconsider the ‘Order on Numbering of Evidence’ of 12 May 2010, ¶ 15 
(Mar. 30, 2011). 
 54 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, at ¶ 603. 
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courts and tribunals have influenced the drafting of the ICC’s 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence,55 where other courts and 
tribunals are in a “comparable position to the Court” because their 
“provisions are equally silent,”56 and where the provisions of the 
Rome Statute are “sufficiently broadly framed” to accommodate 
rules and principles applied by other institutions.57 
The following sections provide an overview of the Court’s 
approach to judicial cross-referencing in the Lubanga case and a 
basis from which to consider its implications for aspects of the 
Court’s identity. 
A. The Frequency and Scope of Judicial Cross-Referencing 
References to external case law can be found throughout the 
course of the ICC’s proceedings in the Lubanga case, from the 
Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision authorizing an arrest warrant in 2006 
to the Trial Chamber’s decision approving and ordering the 
implementation of a plan for collective reparations over a decade 
later. 
Of the 406 decisions that were analyzed as part of this study, 
67 contained references to external case law.  The proportion of 
decisions containing judicial cross-referencing may appear low at 
first sight.  However, 254 out of the 339 decisions without judicial 
cross-referencing were under ten pages long.  Judicial cross-
referencing was, understandably, far more prolific in the Court’s 
longer decisions, which contained detailed analysis on specific 
points of law. 
The frequency of reference was fairly evenly spread across the 
three divisions of the Court, although it was lowest in the Pre-Trial 
 
 55 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-1433, Judgment on the appeal of Mr. 
Lubanga Dyilo against the Oral Decision of Trial Chamber I of 18 January 2008, ¶ 78 
(July 11, 2008).  See also Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-1486, Judgment on 
the appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision of Trial Chamber I entitled “Decision on 
the consequences of non-disclosure of exculpatory materials covered by Article 54(3)(e) 
agreements and the application to stay the prosecution of the accused, together with 
certain other Issues raised at the Status Conference on 10 June 2008,” ¶ 42 n.3 (Oct. 21, 
2008). 
 56 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-2705, at ¶ 15.  See also Prosecutor v. 
Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-2901, Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the 
Statute, ¶ 12 (July 10, 2012) (noting the Court’s “comparable position” to ad hoc 
tribunals but distinguishing the effect of “separate” convictions on sentencing in those 
cases); for further discussion, see infra note 89 and accompanying text. 
 57 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-2727, at ¶ 41. 
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Chamber and highest in the Appeals Chamber.  Judicial cross-
referencing was found in sixteen of the 133 decisions of the Pre-
Trial Chamber (12%), twenty-nine of the 163 decisions of the 
Trial Chamber (18%) and twenty-two of the 110 decisions of the 
Appeals Chamber (20%).  Consequently, the practice of referring 
to external case law is not confined to a particular Chamber, or to 
particular judges, of the ICC; it is a practice that has been adopted 
by a significant proportion of the Court’s judiciary. 
The Chambers referred to a range of international, regional and 
domestic courts and tribunals in the Lubanga proceedings.  The 
range of institutions referred to, and number of references to them, 
is shown in the table below: 
 
 Pre-Trial 
Chamber 
Trial 
Chamber 
Appeals 
Chamber 
Total 
ICTY 28 36 42 106 
ICTR 8 15 29 52 
MICT - - 2 2 
ECCC - 3 1 4 
SCSL 5 8 13 26 
ECtHR 26 18 19 63 
IACtHR 10 15 10 35 
ICJ 6 3 - 9 
ECJ - - 1 1 
Australia - - 2 2 
Canada 1 1 2 4 
Colombia - 1 - 1 
Cyprus - - 3 3 
France - 1 2 3 
Germany - 1 1 2 
New Zealand 1 - 1 2 
South Africa - - 1 1 
UK 4 6 7 17 
US 2 5 3 10 
 
The table shows that the proportion of references to 
international criminal tribunals and other international, regional 
and domestic courts is similar across the different Chambers of the 
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ICC. 
Taken together, the ad hoc tribunals were by far the most 
frequently referenced institutions.  The Lubanga case law 
highlights the significant impact that the case law of the ad hoc 
tribunals has had on the early operation of the Court, despite the 
distinct features of the ICC’s legal framework.  Decisions of the 
ICTY were referred to almost twice as frequently as decisions of 
the ICTR, suggesting that the ICTY’s case law is enjoying a 
stronger legacy through the ICC’s decisions, at least in relation to 
the issues that were raised in the Lubanga case.  In later decisions, 
the ICC’s judges have also referred to the Mechanism for 
International Criminal Tribunals (“MICT”), which has taken over 
the functions of the ad hoc tribunals as they have moved to 
completion.58 
References were made to just two internationalized criminal 
tribunals: the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) and the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (“ECCC”).  
The decisions of both institutions had particular significance in the 
context of the Lubanga case.  The SCSL was the only international 
tribunal that had addressed the war crimes of enlistment, 
conscription and use of child soldiers, of which Mr. Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo had been charged.59  The case law of the ECCC 
was relevant when dealing with issues relating to victims.  Like the 
ICC, the ECCC allows victims to participate in their own right in 
its proceedings and has provision for reparations.60  In this respect, 
the ICC has closer parallels with the ECCC than with the ad hoc 
tribunals. 
More surprising than the number of references to international 
criminal courts and tribunals is the high frequency of reference to 
the case law of regional human rights courts.  The ECtHR was the 
second most frequently referred to institution and the IACtHR was 
the fourth, placing them behind only the ad hoc tribunals in terms 
of frequency of reference.  The Lubanga case law reveals the 
 
 58 The MICT, formally referred to as the International Residual Mechanism for 
Criminal Tribunals, was established by the United Nations, pursuant to S.C. Res. 1966 
(Dec. 22, 2010). 
 59 See, e.g., Prosecution v. Taylor, SCSL 03-01-T-1283, Judgment, ¶¶ 438-44 (May 
12, 2012). 
 60 Victim Participation, EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA, 
https://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/victims-support/participation [https://perma.cc/B3W4-
NYHW]. 
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important place that regional human rights courts hold in the ICC’s 
judicial network and the willingness of the Court’s judges to 
consider and draw from case law beyond the ambit of international 
criminal law.  The high number of references to regional human 
rights case law appears to have been influenced, in part, by a 
reading of Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute to require reference 
to this body of case law.61 
Additionally, there were forty-five references to domestic case 
law and a handful of references to the ECJ and the ICJ.  The 
reference to the ECJ is found in a dissenting opinion to a decision 
of the Appeals Chamber, which considered the application of the 
principle of res judicata in respect of two grounds of appeal.62  The 
opinion noted that the ECJ had “acknowledged chose jugée—res 
judicata as an important principle of law interwoven with legal 
certainty.”63  Reference was made to the jurisprudence of the ICJ 
on the powers of the ICC as an international body64 and when 
assessing the nature of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (“DRC”).65  Again, these references show that judicial 
cross-referencing is serving to situate the ICC in a wider body of 
international law that extends beyond the specialist field of 
 
 61 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-8-Corr 17-03-2006, Decision 
Concerning Pre-Trial Chamber I’s Decision of 10 February 2006 and the Incorporation 
of Documents into the Record of the Case Against Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Annex I, 
¶ 12 (Feb. 24, 2006) (“As required by Article 21(3) of the Statute, the Chamber considers 
this to be the only interpretation consistent with the ‘reasonable suspicion’ standard 
provided for in article 5(1)(c) of the European Convention on Human Rights and the 
interpretation of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in respect of the 
fundamental right of any person to liberty under article 7 of the American Convention of 
Human Rights.”). 
 62 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-568, Judgment on the Prosecutor’s 
appeal against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled “Decision Establishing 
General Principles Governing Applications to Restrict Disclosure pursuant to Rule 81(2) 
and (4) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence,” Dissenting Opinion of Judge Georgios 
M. Pikis, n.36 (Oct. 13, 2006). 
 63 Id. at ¶ 18. 
 64 The Trial Chamber was considering the power of the ICC to send a 
representative of the Registry to speak with witnesses in order to seek their cooperation 
with the Court’s proceedings.  Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-1311, Decision 
on Disclosure Issues, Responsibilities for Protective Measures and other Procedural 
Matters, Annex 2, ¶ 100 (Apr. 24, 2008). 
 65 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-803, Decision on the Confirmation of 
Charges, ¶ 212 (Jan. 29, 2007); Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, 
Judgment Pursuant to Article 72 of the Statute, ¶ 540, 542 (Mar. 14, 2012). 
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international criminal law. 
B. Issues Prompting Reference to External Case Law 
ICC judges have referred to external case law for a wide range 
of issues. The following table breaks down the references by the 
subject matter of the reference and the institution(s) that were 
referred to:  
 
 Procedure 
and 
Admissibility 
Crimes, 
Modes 
of 
Liability 
and 
Defenses 
Sentencing Reparations 
ICTY 63 29 14 - 
ICTR 31 11 10 - 
MICT - - 2 - 
ECCC - - - 4 
SCSL 8 13 5 - 
ECtHR 56 - - 7 
IACtHR 12 - - 23 
ICJ 1 8 - - 
ECJ 1 - - - 
Australia 2 - - - 
Canada 4 - - - 
Colombia - - - 1 
Cyprus 3 - - - 
France 3 - - - 
Germany 2 - - - 
New 
Zealand 
2 - - - 
South 
Africa 
1 - - - 
UK 15 1 1 - 
US 9 - - 1 
Total 213 62 32 36 
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1. Issues of Procedure and Admissibility 
The majority of the references relate to issues of criminal 
procedure.  On these issues, the Chambers have referred to case 
law from a variety of international, regional and domestic courts 
and tribunals.  Issues that have prompted judges to turn to external 
jurisprudence include the disclosure of evidence,66 the right to be 
present at a hearing on the confirmation of charges,67 the procedure 
governing interim release,68 the admissibility of evidence obtained 
during an unlawful search and seizure,69 the disclosure of 
potentially exculpatory material,70 and the use of anonymous 
witnesses.71  Many of these issues raised concerns about 
compliance with the rights of the accused, explaining the high 
number of references to the case law of regional human rights 
courts. 
It is perhaps more surprising that the judges of the ICC turned 
to external jurisprudence when dealing with issues of 
admissibility,72 given the ICC’s unique system for determining the 
admissibility of cases to the Court, which is rooted in its 
underlying principle of complementarity.  The judges of the Pre-
Trial Chamber made reference to the case law of the ad hoc 
tribunals and the SCSL when interpreting the requirement under 
Article 17(1)(d) of the Rome Statute that, to be admissible, cases 
must be “of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the 
 
 66 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-102, Decision on the Final System of 
Disclosure and the Establishment of a Timetable, ¶ ¶ 3, 14 (May 15, 2006). 
 67 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-108 Corr, Decision Establishing 
General Principles Governing Applications to Restrict Disclosure pursuant to Rule 81(2) 
and (4) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, ¶¶ 8-38 (May 19, 2006). 
 68 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-586, Decision on the Application for 
the interim release of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ¶¶ 6-7 (Oct. 18, 2006). 
 69 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-1981, Decision on the admission of 
material from the “bar table,” ¶¶ 19-45 (Jun. 24, 2009). 
 70 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-1401, Decision on the consequences of 
non-disclosure of exculpatory materials covered by Article 54(3)(e) agreements and the 
application to stay the prosecution of the accused, together with certain other issues 
raised at the Status Conference on 10 June 2008, ¶¶ 77-86 (Jun. 13, 2008). 
 71 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-1119, Decision on victims’ 
participation, ¶ 78 (Jan. 18, 2008). 
 72 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-8, Decision Concerning Pre-Trial 
Chamber I’s Decision of 10 February 2006 and the Incorporation of Documents into the 
Record of the Case against Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ¶¶ 46 n.37, 47-48 (Feb. 24, 2006) 
(considering cases before the SCSL). 
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Court.”73  When rejecting the approach of the Pre-Trial Chamber 
to the gravity requirement, the Appeals Chamber questioned its 
reliance on the case law of the ad hoc tribunals, highlighting the 
different context in which they operated.74 
2. Crimes and Modes of Liability 
A much more limited range of institutions were referred to 
when interpreting the crimes charged in the Lubanga case, namely 
the ad hoc tribunals, the SCSL and the ICJ. 
The Trial Chamber made frequent reference to the case law of 
the ICTY when determining the nature of the conflict in the DRC 
and acknowledged that it had “derived assistance from the 
jurisprudence of the ICTY” in relation to the issue in its final 
judgment.75  The Trial Chamber followed the approach of the Pre-
Trial Chamber to the definition of an international and a non-
international armed conflict, both of which had been shaped by the 
jurisprudence of the ICTY.76  When defining a non-international 
armed conflict, the Trial Chamber turned to the ICTY for a non-
exhaustive list of factors for determining if a body was an 
organized group and to determine the relevance of the intensity of 
the conflict.77  It also drew from the ICTY the test of “overall 
control” in determining whether a non-international armed conflict 
had become internationalized due to the involvement of armed 
forces acting on the behalf of another State.78 
The references to the case law of the ICJ related to the 
definition of “occupation” for the purpose of establishing whether 
the conflict was international in character.79  The Trial Chamber 
also referred to the decisions of the ICTY and ICJ to support the 
conclusion that conflicts of a different nature may take place on a 
 
 73 Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 17(1)(d). 
 74 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-169, Judgment on the Prosecutor’s appeal 
against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled “Decision on the Prosecutor’s 
Application for Warrants of Arrest, Article 58,” ¶ 80 (Jul. 12, 2006). See § 4.E below. 
 75 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 
of the Statute, ¶ 533 (Mar. 14, 2012). 
 76 Id. at ¶¶ 535, 541. 
 77 Id. at ¶¶ 537-38. 
 78 Id. at ¶ 541. See also Prosecutor v. Tadić, case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, ¶ 116-
45 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber July 15, 1999). 
 79 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 
of the Statute, ¶ 542 (Mar. 14, 2012). 
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single territory at the same time and that international and non-
international armed conflicts can co-exist.80 
Case law of the SCSL was referred to in the interpretation of 
the war crimes of conscripting, enlisting, and using child soldiers.  
The Trial Chamber recognized the significance of the SCSL case 
law given that the provisions of the Rome Statute mirrored the 
provisions of the Statute of the SCSL on this issue.81  The case law 
of the SCSL was cited to support the conclusion that conscription, 
enlistment, and use are separate offences,82 and that a child’s 
consent does not provide a valid defense to enlistment.83  When 
considering the scope of the prohibition on the “use” of child 
soldiers, the Trial Chamber noted the determination of the SCSL 
that “the use of children to participate actively in hostilities is not 
restricted to children directly involved in combat” and that the 
crime “encompasses putting their lives directly at risk in 
combat.”84 
When addressing the argument of the defense that Thomas 
Lubanga Dylio was not aware that voluntarily or forcibly 
recruiting children under the age of fifteen and using them to 
participate actively in hostilities would entail his criminal 
responsibility, the Pre-Trial Chamber also noted case law from the 
SCSL to the effect that “prior to November 1996, the prohibition 
against child recruitment had already crystallized as a customary 
law norm.”85 
Several references were also made to the ad hoc tribunals in 
the interpretation of the ICC’s modes of liability.  In its 
interpretation of the concept of “joint commission” under Article 
25(1)(a) of the Rome Statute, the Trial Chamber adopted the 
“control over crime” approach, which was described by Judge 
Fulford in his Separate Opinion as having been drawn from a 
“minority view from the ad hoc tribunals.”86  The majority of the 
 
 80 Id. ¶ 540. 
 81 Id. ¶ 603. 
 82 Id. ¶ 609. 
 83 Id. ¶ 616. 
 84 Id. ¶¶ 624-26. 
 85 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-803, Decision on the Confirmation of 
Charges, ¶¶ 299, 311 (Jan. 29, 2007). 
 86 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 
of the Statute, Separate Opinion of Judge Fulford, ¶ 10 (Mar. 14, 2012) (citing 
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Trial Chamber also supported its conclusion that “principal 
liability ‘objectively’ requires a greater contribution than 
accessory liability” by reference to case law of the ICTY.87 
3. Sentencing 
On sentencing issues, the Chambers referred primarily to the 
case law of other international and internationalized criminal 
justice mechanisms.  In the opening paragraphs of the Trial 
Chamber’s sentencing judgment, the judges discussed the 
relevance of external case law in the context of the ICC’s 
sentencing regime.88  They noted that the ad hoc tribunals were in 
a “comparable position to the Court in the context of sentencing” 
but that “the only convictions by an international criminal tribunal 
for the recruitment or use of child soldiers are from the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone (“SCSL”).”89  The utility of the SCSL case 
law was limited by the fact that in two cases, the SCSL Trial 
Chamber had not addressed each count separately, making it 
“impossible to determine the effect the conviction for the use of 
child soldiers had on the overall sentences.”90 
The Trial and Appeals Chambers subsequently referred to the 
case law of the ad hoc tribunals on a range of issues, including the 
standard of proof for establishing aggravating factors,91 factors to 
be taken into consideration in establishing the gravity of the 
crime,92 the principle of double counting,93 the standard of review 
for appeals against decisions on sentencing,94 and the impact of 
alleged violations of the accused’s fundamental right in the 
sentencing process.95  When considering early release, the Appeals 
 
Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-803, n.418, n.422-26, n.432, n.434, n.436, 
n.442 (Jan. 29, 2007)). 
 87 Id. ¶ 997 (Chamber opinion). 
 88 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-2901, Decision on Sentence pursuant 
to Article 76 of the Statute ¶ 12 (Jul. 10, 2012). 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. ¶ 33. 
 92 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-3122, Judgment on the appeals of the 
Prosecutor and Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the “Decision on Sentence pursuant to 
Article 76 of the Statute,” ¶¶ 51, 74-77 (Dec. 1, 2014). 
 93 Id. at ¶ 17. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-2901, ¶ 35. 
 94 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-3122, ¶¶ 42-43, 46. 
 95 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-3122, ¶ 109. 
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Chamber also made reference to UK case law, noting that “some 
national jurisdictions . . . do not place a burden of proof upon 
sentenced persons in their respective early release proceedings.”96 
4. Reparations 
The only area in which the number of references to regional 
human rights case law outnumbered references to international and 
internationalized criminal tribunals was in relation to reparations.  
Here, the majority of the references were to regional human rights 
courts.  A lower number of references were made to the ECCC and 
to domestic courts. 
The Trial Chamber recognized a body of case law that had 
been referred to in the submissions of the Trust Fund for Victims, 
the Office of Public Counsel for Victims and the Defence on 
issues such as the nature of the harm suffered that is necessary to 
be eligible for reparations,97 the standard of proof for reparations,98 
and the rights of the accused.99  In its reasoning, the Trial Chamber 
referred to case law from regional human rights courts to support 
its reasoning on the beneficiaries,100 scope,101 and modalities of 
reparations,102 as well as the issue of causation between the 
relevant crimes and the harm that had been caused.103  The Appeals 
Chamber also referred to external case law in support of its 
reasoning on the modalities of reparations,104 causation,105 the 
decision to order both collective and individual reparations on the 
 
 96 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-3173, Decision on the 
Review Concerning Reduction of Sentence of Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ¶ 32 n.46 
(Sept. 22, 2015). 
 97 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2904, Decision Establishing 
the Principles and Procedures to be Applied to Reparations, ¶¶ 86-87 (Aug. 7, 2012). 
 98 Id. ¶ 98; see also id. ¶ 101. 
 99 Id. ¶ 124. 
 100 Id. ¶ 195. 
 101 Id. ¶ 220. 
 102 Id. ¶ 223, 229-30, 233, 236, 237-38. 
 103 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2904, Decision Establishing 
the Principles and Procedures to be Applied to Reparations, ¶¶ 238, 249 (Aug. 7, 2012). 
 104 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-3129, Judgment on the appeals against 
the “Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to reparations” of 
7 August 2012 with AMENDED Order for Reparations (Annex A) and Public Annexes I 
and 2, ¶¶ 33, 39, 40, 43, 67 (Mar. 3, 2015). 
 105 Id. ¶¶ 126-27. 
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basis of the individual reparation requests,106 and the ability of the 
defendant to challenge the requests of individuals eligible to 
participate in collective reparations.107 
C. Impact on the Court’s Reasoning 
In terms of their impact on the Court’s decision-making, the 
references to external case law in the Lubanga case can be divided 
into three broad categories: 
1. Superficial or Background References 
The first category encompasses superficial or background 
references, which are not clearly related to the reasoning of the 
Chamber.  These references either acknowledge the approaches of 
other institutions in order to provide context for the Court’s 
decision or reference case law that has been cited by one of the 
parties or participants to the proceedings without referring back to 
it in the Chamber’s own reasoning.  The remaining two 
categories—use of external case law as interpretive guidance and 
as a means of filling gaps in the Rome Statute—are more 
significant in terms of their impact on the Court’s reasoning. 
2. Interpretive Guidance 
The most frequent use of external case law in the Lubanga 
case was in the interpretation of the Rome Statute and its 
accompanying texts: the ICC’s Elements of Crimes and its Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence (“ICC’s RPE”). 
Within this category of references, the majority were used to 
support the reasoning of the judges or to demonstrate consistency 
with wider international law.  More often than not, the supporting 
case law was simply cited in a footnote.  On a number of 
occasions, however, the judges emphasized the compatibility of 
their decisions with wider international law in their reasoning.  For 
example, having outlined its approach to the disclosure of the 
identity of prosecution witnesses under Rule 81(4) of the ICC’s 
RPE in situations where it would put the witnesses at risk, the Pre-
Trial Chamber highlighted that “[a] similar approach has been 
adopted in other international tribunals in which the disclosure of 
 
 106 Id. ¶ 145. 
 107 Id. ¶ 166. 
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the identity of prosecution witnesses can be delayed before the 
commencement of the trial, if exceptional circumstances so 
require,” citing decisions of the ICTY and the ICTR.108  When 
holding that an interlocutory appeal under Article 82(1)(d) of the 
Rome Statute should be regarded as exceptional, the Trial 
Chamber noted decisions of the ad hoc tribunals and the SCSL, 
“which have similarly described the exceptional nature of 
interlocutory appeals.”109 
The tendency of the judges to emphasize the coherence of their 
reasoning with wider international law was particularly manifest in 
relation to issues concerning the rights of the accused.110  
Examples include the Pre-Trial Chamber’s reference to regional 
human rights case law to show that its interpretation of the 
“reasonable grounds to believe” standard in Article 58(1) is 
consistent with internationally recognized human rights.111  The 
Trial Chamber has highlighted the consistency of its decisions 
with the case law of regional human rights courts on a range of 
issues, including change in the legal characterization of the facts of 
the case,112 the disclosure of exculpatory material,113 the use of 
anonymous witnesses,114 and the admission of evidence obtained 
 
 108 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-489, Decision on Second Defence 
Motion for Leave to Appeal, 10 n.32 (Sept. 28, 2006). 
 109 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-1191, Decision on the Defence and 
Prosecution Requests for Leave to Appeal the Decision on Victims’ Participation of 18 
January 2008, ¶ 13 (Feb. 26, 2008). 
 110 See Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-8, Decision concerning Pre-Trial 
Chamber I’s Decision of 10 February 2006 and the Incorporation of Documents into the 
Record of the Case against Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, (Feb. 24, 2006). 
 111 Id. ¶ 12. 
 112 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-0/106-2093, Clarification and further 
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parties and participants that the legal characterisation of the facts may be subject to 
change in accordance with Regulation 55(2) of the Regulations of the Court,” ¶ 8 (Aug. 
27, 2009). 
 113 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-1401, Decision on the consequences of 
non-disclosure of exculpatory materials covered by Article 54(3)(e) agreements and the 
application to stay the prosecution of the accused, together with certain other issues 
raised at the Status Conference on 10 June 2008, ¶¶ 77-81 (June 13, 2008). 
 114 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-1924, Decision issuing corrected and 
redacted versions of “Decision on the “Prosecution’s Request for non-Disclosure of the 
Identity of Twenty-Five Individuals Providing Tu Quoque Information” of 5 December 
2008,” Annex 2, ¶ 17 (Jun. 2, 2009). 
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during an unlawful search and seizure.115  The Appeals Chamber 
has also referred to the decisions of regional human rights courts 
to show that its approach to issues of procedure has been 
consistent with internationally recognized human rights.116  
Together with regional human rights jurisprudence, the decisions 
of the ad hoc tribunals and domestic courts have been cited in 
order to show that the Court’s interpretation of its core documents 
is compliant with internationally recognized human rights, in 
accordance with Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute.117 
More often than not, the Court’s decisions do not indicate the 
impact that external case law has had on the reasoning of the 
judges.  Consequently, it is difficult to determine whether or not 
the case law to which the court refers has influence, or provided 
the basis for, the Court’s decisions, or if it has been used merely to 
reinforce conclusions reached on other grounds.  There are, 
however, rare exceptions.  For example, in some cases judges have 
referred to external case law as being “persuasive,”118 indicating 
that it has influenced their decision-making.  In other cases, judges 
have asserted that their interpretation of the Rome Statute is 
consistent with internationally recognized human rights, as 
required by Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute.119 
 
 115 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-1981, Decision on the admission of 
material from the “bar table,” ¶¶ 22-31 (Jun. 24, 2009). 
 116 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-774, Judgment on the appeal of Mr. 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled “Second 
Decision on the Prosecution Requests and Amended Requests for Redactions under Rule 
81,” ¶ 30 (Dec. 14, 2006). Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-1401, Judgment on 
the Appeal of the Prosecutor Against the Decision of Trial Chamber I entitled “Decision 
on the Consequences of non-Disclosure of Exculpatory Materials Covered by Article 
54(3)(e) Agreements and the Application to Stay the Prosecution of the Accused, 
Together with Certain other Issues Raised at the Status Conference on 10 June 2008”, ¶¶ 
46-47 (Jun. 13, 2008). 
 117 When rejecting the submission of the Defense that anything short of full defense 
access to the Prosecution file would infringe upon Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo’s right to 
a fair trial, the Pre-Trial Chamber observed that the submission “would be violated by 
jurisdictions as diverse as for instance, [the ICTY] and a number of national jurisdictions 
where disclosure provides a key tool to guarantee the right to a fair trial.” Prosecutor v. 
Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-102, Decision on the Final System of Disclosure and the 
Establishment of a Timetable, ¶ 14 (May 15, 2006). 
 118 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-3122, Judgment on the appeals of the 
Prosecutor and Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the “Decision on Sentence pursuant to 
Article 76 of the Statute,” ¶¶ 76-77 (Dec. 1, 2014). 
 119 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-8, Decision concerning Pre-Trial 
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3. Gap-Filling 
In a much smaller number of decisions, external case law has 
been referred to in the identification of rules and principles to fill 
gaps in the ICC’s legal framework.  In these decisions, the 
Chambers have shown much more caution in determining the legal 
basis for the rules being considered for adoption and have resisted 
the introduction of new rules or principles through the application 
of Article 21(1)(b) or (c) of the Rome Statute, prioritizing instead 
the Court’s core documents, referred to in Article 21(1)(a). 
External jurisprudence was, for example, referred to by the 
Pre-Trial and Trial Chambers to determine the permissibility of 
witness proofing in the ICC’s proceedings.120  The judges of the 
Pre-Trial Chamber found support for the practice of witness 
familiarization in the ICC’s procedural framework but could not 
find support for the more controversial practice of witness 
proofing under the Rome Statute or the ICC’s RPE.121  The 
Chambers concluded that the Prosecutor’s contention that the 
practice “is a widely accepted practice in international law” was 
unsupported, highlighting that the Prosecutor had not put forward 
any jurisprudence from the ICTR and questioning the relevance of 
case law from the SCSL that had been referenced.122  The 
Chambers also found that the approach to witness proofing in 
national jurisdictions “varies widely” and that there was no 
evidence of a general principle of law.123  The Trial Chamber 
concluded that “[a]lthough this practice is accepted to an extent in 
two legal systems, both of which are founded upon common law 
traditions, this does not provide a sufficient basis for any 
conclusion that a general principle based on established practice of 
national legal systems exists.”124  The practice of witness proofing 
 
Chamber I’s Decision of 10 February 2006 and the Incorporation of Documents into the 
Record of the Case against Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ¶ 12 (Feb. 24, 2006). 
 120 See Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-679, Decision on the Practices of 
Witness Familiarisation and Witness Proofing (Nov. 8, 2006); Prosecutor v. Lubanga, 
ICC-01/04-01/06-1049, Decision Regarding the Practices Used to Prepare and 
Familiarize Witnesses for Giving Testimony at Trial (Nov. 30, 2007). 
 121 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-679, ¶ 28. 
 122 Id. ¶¶ 29-31. 
 123 Id. ¶ 36.  
 124 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-1049, ¶ 41. 
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was ultimately deemed impermissible.125 
Resistance to the application of rules and principles under 
Articles 21(1)(b) and (c) can also be found in the reasoning of the 
Appeals Chamber when considering the incorporation of the 
doctrine of abuse of process into the procedural law of the ICC.  
The applicability of the doctrine initially came under the Court’s 
consideration as a result of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo’s attempt 
to challenge the jurisdiction of the Court on the grounds that he 
had been unlawfully detained and ill-treated by Congolese 
authorities prior to his arrest under an ICC arrest warrant.126  
Having determined that there was no basis to apply the doctrine of 
abuse of process under Article 21(1) of the Rome Statute, the 
Appeals Chamber recognized that the doctrine had “a human 
rights dimension” and could be applied under Article 21(3).127  
External jurisprudence was significant in supporting the 
Chamber’s conclusion that serious breaches of the rights of the 
accused could render a fair trial impossible.128  The decision 
suggests that the Chambers may take a more flexible approach to 
the incorporation of new principles and rules, and external 
jurisprudence elaborating upon them, where they support the rights 
of the accused and can be embraced by Article 21(3) of the Rome 
Statute. 
D. Departures from External Jurisprudence 
Where external case law has been cited in the Lubanga case, it 
has been used most frequently to support the Court’s reasoning.  
There are, however, a small number of occasions where the ICC’s 
judges have made express departures from external case law. 
The main justification for departure has been the Court’s legal 
framework, in particular the provisions of the Rome Statute and 
the ICC’s RPE.  In the Trial Chamber’s decision on witness 
proofing, which has already been discussed, the judges highlighted 
the incompatibility of the practice, which had been adopted at the 
 
 125 See id. 
 126 See Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-772, Judgment on the Appeal of 
Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the 
Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to article 19(2)(a) of the Rome Statute of 3 October 
2006 (Dec. 14, 2006). 
 127 Id. ¶¶ 34-39. 
 128 Id. ¶ 38. 
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ad hoc tribunals, with the Court’s procedural law.129  They noted 
that “[t]he ICC Statute has, through important advances, created a 
procedural framework which differs markedly from the ad hoc 
tribunals.”130  For this reason, “the procedure of preparation of 
witnesses before trial is not easily transferable into the system of 
law created by the ICC Statute and Rules.”131 Consequently, while 
the Trial Chamber acknowledged the importance of considering 
the practice and jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals, it was “not 
persuaded that the application of ad hoc procedures, in the context 
of preparation of witnesses for trial [was] appropriate.”132 
The wording of the Rome Statute has also drawn judges to 
depart from external jurisprudence on matters concerning the 
scope of criminal liability under the Rome Statute. The Pre-Trial 
and Trial Chambers departed from the theory of joint criminal 
enterprise that had been developed at the ICTY due to the structure 
and wording of Article 25(3) of the Rome Statute, which outlines 
several modes of liability for the ICC.133  The Pre-Trial Chamber 
highlighted that rather than accepting the objective and subjective 
approaches for distinguishing between principals and accessories 
to a crime, “the Statute embraces the third approach, which is 
based on the concept of control over the crime” and, in this sense, 
departs from the jurisprudence of the ICTY.134  The majority of the 
Trial Chamber adopted the same approach.135  The wording of the 
Rome Statute was also given as a reason for departing from “a line 
of jurisprudence from the ad hoc tribunals” which questioned the 
 
 129 See Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-679, Decision on the Practices of 
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 135 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 
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3121, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against his conviction, ¶¶ 
471-72 (Dec. 1, 2014). 
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usefulness of a distinction between international and non-
international armed conflict.136  Again, on sentencing, the Appeals 
Chamber rejected the defense’s argument that “there is a 
presumption of release once two thirds of a sentence has been 
served or that this is a relevant factor for the purpose of a review 
of sentence . . . ” because the “legal regimes for early release at the 
tribunals referred to by Mr. Lubanga differ from the Court’s legal 
regime.”137 
Less frequently, the judges have cited differences in the 
function of the ICC and other institutions as a reason for departing 
from their case law.  One example of this can be found in the 
Court’s interpretation of the concept of gravity under the ICC’s 
admissibility criteria.  The Appeals Chamber considered the 
reliance of the Pre-Trial Chamber on the law and practice of the ad 
hoc tribunals to be “flawed,” given the different contexts in which 
the institutions were operating.138  It drew a distinction between the 
ad hoc tribunals, which were moving towards completion, and the 
ICC, which was “beginning, rather than ending, its activities.”139  
The permanent nature of the ICC, and inability to predict the 
situations upon which it would be called to address, justified a 
rejection of the “extremely high threshold” attributed to the gravity 
criterion by the Pre-Trial Chamber, which may have weakened the 
preventative effect of the Court’s proceedings.140 
The judges have also noted the “limited guidance” of rulings of 
the ECtHR in the context of reparations proceedings on the basis 
that the “court does not adjudicate reparations claims with respect 
to convicted persons[] . . . it deals with the responsibility of a State 
 
 136 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, ¶ 539 (The Chamber also noted 
that “the international/non-international distinction is . . .  an established part of the 
international law of armed conflict.”). 
 137 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-3173, Decision on the review 
concerning reduction of sentence of Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ¶ 27 (Sep. 22, 2015). 
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Application for Warrants of Arrest, Article 58,” ¶ 80 (Jul. 13, 2006). 
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for violations of the human rights guaranteed in the Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.”141  
Responding to the argument of the Office of Public Counsel for 
the Victims that “international human rights jurisprudence 
demonstrates the obligation of a court to determine all applications 
before it,” the Appeals Chamber, again, distinguished the ICC 
from human rights courts, highlighting that it was addressing the 
existence of an internationally recognized human right to 
“individual applications for reparations, in cases where the 
applicable law provides for both individual and collective awards 
for reparations and a collective award is made.”142 
In its earlier decision on reparations, the Trial Chamber 
recognized “the substantial contribution by regional human rights 
bodies in furthering the right of individuals to an effective remedy 
and to reparations” and noted that it had been “taken into account” 
whilst acknowledging in a footnote the differing function of the 
institutions.143  The footnote explained that “[w]hile human rights 
courts such as the IACtHR and the ECtHR have the power to order 
reparations against States rather than individuals, general concepts 
relating to reparations which have been established through the 
jurisprudence of these courts can provide useful guidance to the 
ICC.”144 
The decisions of the Trial and Appeal Chambers on victim 
reparations demonstrate that while differences in the function of 
the ICC and regional human rights courts have not deterred 
judicial cross-referencing, they have been considered in assessing 
the relevance of human rights case law and the appropriateness of 
adopting similar reasoning at the ICC. 
 
 141 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-3129, Judgment on the appeals against 
the “Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to reparations” of 
7 August 2012 with AMENDED order for reparations (Annex A) and public annexes 1 
and 2, ¶ 127 (Mar. 3, 2015). 
 142 Id. ¶¶ 154-55. 
 143 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-2904, Decision establishing the 
principles and procedures to be applied to reparations, ¶ 186 (Aug. 7, 2012). 
 144 Id. ¶ 186 n. 377. 
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V.  Lubanga, Judicial Cross-Referencing and the Identity 
of the ICC 
A. The ICC’s Relationship with Wider International Law 
The Lubanga case law reveals a Court that is integrated into a 
wide network of courts and engaged with external case law on a 
range of legal issues.  It also reveals a Court that is viewed from 
within as part of a much wider body of international law—one that 
extends beyond the specialized field of international criminal law.  
Of particular note is the willingness of the ICC’s judges to refer to 
regional human rights case law, which counters Terris et al’s 
hypothesis that judges in international courts will avoid referring 
to regional case law in the interpretation of international law.145  
While the judges of the ICC have tended not to articulate the 
impact of external case law on their reasoning, the data above 
suggests that it is influencing the interpretation of the Court’s 
applicable law and providing a source of assistance in identifying 
rules and principles to fill gaps in the Rome Statute. 
The Court’s approach to judicial cross-referencing in the 
Lubanga case is significant in reducing the potential for 
inconsistencies, or “fragmentation,” in the law applied by the ICC 
and other institutions. The content analysis set out above provides 
further evidence of the role that judges are playing in supporting 
the coherence of international law, within and beyond the field of 
international criminal law, through cross-fertilization of case 
law.146  The practice will help to reconcile the applicable law of the 
ICC with customary international law, as applied by the ad hoc 
tribunals and other internationalized and domestic criminal courts 
and tribunals.  In doing so, it will support the clarity of 
international criminal law and its ability to communicate the 
boundaries of lawful conduct and deter the commission of 
international crimes.  The promotion of a coherent body of 
international criminal law will also reduce the potential for 
inequitable treatment of defendants where individuals suspected of 
committing international crimes are tried before different judicial 
mechanisms. 
The Lubanga case law does, however, also reflect the ICC 
 
 145 DANIEL TERRIS ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL JUDGE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
MEN AND WOMEN WHO DECIDE THE WORLD’S CASES 121 (2007). 
 146 For further evidence beyond the ICC see MILLER, supra note 6, at 483. 
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judges’ commitment to respecting the text of the Rome Statute and 
its priority over other sources of law.  On a number of occasions, 
the text of the Rome Statute and the Court’s Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence have prompted judges to depart from the practice of 
other courts and tribunals, including that of the ICTY and ICTR.  
The level of detail contained in the Court’s core documents has 
limited the ability of the ICC’s judges to take a consistent 
approach to similar legal issues and has resulted in a Court that 
will remain, in certain respects, isolated from wider international 
law.  The tendency of the ICC’s judges to refer to wider 
international law, even in the event of departure has, however, 
allowed them to contribute to the coherence and integrity of the 
law by offering reasons for their departures, demonstrating that 
they are conscious and principled, rather than arbitrary or 
uninformed.147 
Broad trends can be identified in the Lubanga case law as to 
the relative strength of the relationship between the ICC and other 
judicial institutions.  The content analysis shows that some 
institutions (in particular, the ad hoc tribunals and regional human 
rights courts) have been referred to more frequently than others 
(such as domestic courts, internationalized criminal courts and 
tribunals, and the ICJ) and that the range of institutions referred to 
changes depending on the nature of the issue addressed, i.e. 
whether it concerns the ICC’s crimes and modes of liability, 
procedural rules, sentencing regime, or reparations.  These trends 
may change over time as ad hoc tribunals close, new institutions 
are established, and the body of domestic case law containing 
interpretations of international crimes continues to grow.  They are 
also likely to be affected by the specific issues that arise in future 
cases.  For example, while regional human rights case law was not 
referred to in the interpretation of the ICC’s crimes in the Lubanga 
case, it may play a greater role in the interpretation of other crimes 
under the Rome Statute, such as torture, inhuman and degrading 
treatment, and enslavement, where regional human rights courts 
have built a significant body of jurisprudence.148 
Beyond the trends outlined above, the Lubanga case law 
 
 147 See Ronald Dworkin, LAW’S EMPIRE 176-275 (1986). 
 148 The case law of the ECtHR has, for example, been a significant point of 
reference for the ad hoc tribunals in the interpretation of torture and inhuman or 
degrading treatment.  See de Frouville, supra note 9. 
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provides little indication of when the ICC’s judges will turn to 
different bodies of external case law on any particular issue.  On 
issues of procedure, which have prompted judges to refer to case 
law from the widest array of external institutions, decisions of the 
ad hoc tribunals, human rights courts and domestic courts have 
been referred to interchangeably, without any indication of an 
underlying logic or hierarchy.  It is not possible to draw firm 
conclusions from the Lubanga case law as to whether the ICC’s 
judges will turn to regional human rights law, domestic case law, 
or the case law of international and internationalized criminal 
courts when determining whether their reasoning is compatible 
with internationally recognized human rights, in accordance with 
Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute. 
A degree of ad hoc-ism in the range of institutions referred to 
can be attributed to the fact that the reasoning of the Chambers 
must respond to the submissions of the parties and participants in 
the proceedings.  On certain issues, the case law of one institution 
has been pitched against another in support of different 
submissions.  For example, in its decision on reparations, the Trial 
Chamber acknowledged both case law from the ECCC, which had 
been cited by the Defense, and case law from the IACtHR, which 
had been cited by OPCV, in support of their respective 
submissions on the standard and burden of proof for victim 
reparations.149  The Lubanga case law indicates that the strength of 
the relationship between the ICC and other institutions is being 
influenced, at least in part, by the resourcefulness of the parties 
and their familiarity with, and willingness to draw from, the case 
law of other courts and tribunals. 
The Lubanga case law also provides little indication of the 
factors that will influence whether or not external case law is 
followed.  The ICC’s judges have been sensitive to variations in 
the function of the ICC and other institutions, as well as the 
compatibility of external case law with the Rome Statute and the 
ICC’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence.  These factors are not, 
however, sufficient to determine whether the ICC will follow the 
practice of other institutions on any particular issue. 
 
 149 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-2904, Decision establishing the 
principles and procedures to be applied to reparations, ¶¶ 98, 101 (Aug. 7, 2012). 
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B. Legitimacy 
The uncertainties that arise from the Court’s relationship with 
external jurisprudence have implications for several aspects of the 
Court’s identity, including its legitimacy. 
According to Thomas Franck, there are four properties of rule 
legitimacy in the community of states: determinacy, symbolic 
validation, coherence, and adherence to a normative hierarchy.150  
One of the key issues raised by the Court’s approach to external 
jurisprudence in the Lubanga case relates to the property of 
adherence.  Adherence refers to “the vertical nexus between a 
single primary rule of obligation . . . and a pyramid of secondary 
rules about how rules are made, interpreted and applied: rules, in 
other words, about rules.”151  Under Franck’s thesis, secondary 
rules have a legitimating function that increases a rule’s 
compliance pull.  He argues that: 
 
“A rule . . . is more likely to obligate if it is made within the 
procedural and institutional framework of an organized 
community than if it is strictly an ad hoc agreement between 
parties in the state of nature.  The same rule is still more likely to 
obligate if it is made within the hierarchically structured 
procedural and constitutional framework of a sophisticated 
community rather than in a primitive community lacking such 
secondary rules about rules.”152 
 
A key problem raised by the Court’s approach to external 
jurisprudence in the Lubanga case is the absence of reasoning that 
situates external jurisprudence with the ICC’s secondary rules of 
applicable law and interpretation.  While these rules have typically 
been set out at the beginning of the Court’s decisions, or at the 
beginning of the reasoning of the Chamber, specific references to 
external case law have not been linked back to them.153  
Consequently, many of the uncertainties surrounding the legal 
basis for judicial cross-referencing that were left by the drafters of 
 
 150 Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 
705, 712 (1988) [hereinafter Franck]. 
 151 Id. at 752. 
 152 Id.  
 153 For example, see Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-803, Decision on the 
confirmation of charges, ¶¶ 208-10 (Jan. 29, 2007). 
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the Rome Statute have remained unresolved.154 
Even where the Chambers have considered the relevance of 
external jurisprudence under the provisions of Article 21, 
important questions have been left unanswered.  For example, 
when considering the permissibility of witness proofing, the Trial 
Chamber rejected the practice that had been “commonly utilized at 
the ad hoc Tribunals[]” on the basis of differences in the ICC’s 
procedural framework without engaging with the question as to 
when the procedural rules and jurisprudence of the ad hoc 
tribunals would constitute “principles and rules of international 
law[]” for the purposes of Article 21(1)(b).155  Similarly, while 
Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute has been referred to frequently 
when the judges have cited regional human rights jurisprudence,156 
the Court has not provided any insight into its criteria for 
identifying an internationally recognized human right.  This is 
particularly problematic given that the Court has understood 
Article 21(3) to act not only as a rule of interpretation, but also as 
a foundation for the incorporation of new powers, such as the 
power to stall proceedings in the event of abuse of process, into 
the ICC’s applicable law.157 
The lack of reference to the Court’s legal framework is 
particularly prevalent in the Lubanga case law where judges have 
referred to external jurisprudence for guidance in the interpretation 
of the Rome Statute.158  The Chambers have rarely referred to the 
rules of interpretation in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (1969) when referring to external jurisprudence.159  Where 
 
 154 See Lubanga, Section 3. 
 155 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-1049, Decision Regarding the 
Practices Used to Prepare and Familiarize Witnesses for Giving Testimony at Trial, ¶¶ 
43-45 (Nov. 30, 2007). 
 156 For example, see Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-8, Decision 
Concerning Pre-Trial Chamber I’s Decision of 10 February 2005 and the Incorporation 
of Documents into the Record of the Case against Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ¶ 12 (Feb. 
24, 2006); Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/-06-772, Judgment on the Appeal of 
Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the 
Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to article 19(2)(a) of the Statute of 3 October 2006, ¶ 
36-39 (Dec. 14, 2006). 
 157 See Lubanga, Section 4.C.ii. 
 158 Where the Chambers have referred to external jurisprudence in considering the 
incorporation of a new procedural rule under Article 21(b) and (c), the reasoning has 
been far more detailed.  See id. 
 159 But see Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-8, Decision Concerning Pre-
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the Vienna rules have been referred to, the judges have not 
explained how external jurisprudence relates to them. 
Surprisingly, given its potential to be used as a basis for the 
integration of different legal regimes, the judges of the ICC have 
not referred to Article 31(3)(c) VCLT as a legal basis for judicial 
cross-referencing.  This trend may be influenced by the fact that 
the Court’s use of external case law in the Lubanga case exceeds 
the boundaries of the text of Article 31(3)(c).  The judges of the 
ICC have frequently referred to case law discussing norms that are 
not “binding on the parties” to the Rome Statute, including, most 
notably, those contained in regional human rights treaties and 
domestic criminal law.160  The case law of the ICC in the Lubanga 
case indicates that the ICC’s judges are developing interpretive 
practices that go beyond the wording of the VCLT–a trend that has 
also been identified in the practice of the ECtHR when its judges 
have made reference to wider public international law norms.161  
At present, the Court’s use of external jurisprudence in the 
interpretation of the Rome Statute lacks a clear legal basis and, 
consequently, negatively impacts the legitimacy of the ICC when 
understood in terms of adherence to a hierarchical framework of 
secondary rules. 
The uncertain role of external jurisprudence under the ICC’s 
rules of interpretation is particularly significant in light of the 
reluctance of the Court’s judges to identify lacunae in the Rome 
Statute and to focus more heavily on the interpretation of the 
 
Trial Chamber I’s Decision of 10 February 2006 and the Incorporation of Documents 
into the Record of the Case against Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ¶¶ 42-46 (Feb. 24, 
2006); Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-102, Decision on the Final System of 
Disclosure and the Establishment of a Timetable, ¶¶ 1-3 (May 15, 2006); Prosecutor v. 
Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-108, Decision Establishing General Principles Governing 
Applications to Restrict Disclosure pursuant to Rule 81 (2) and (4) of the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence, ¶¶ 7-8 (May 19, 2006); Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-
01/06-803, Decision on the confirmation of charges, ¶ 276 (Jan. 29, 2007); Prosecutor v. 
Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-1486, Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the 
decision of Trial Chamber I entitled “Decision on the consequences of non-disclosure of 
exculpatory materials covered by Article 54(3)(e) agreements and the application to stay 
the prosecution of the accused, together with certain other issues raised at the Status 
Conference on 10 June 2008,” ¶ 40 (Oct. 21, 2008). 
 160 See Lubanga supra Section 3. 
 161 See Adamantia Rachovitsa, Fragmentation of International Law Revisited: 
Insights, Good Practices and Lessons to be Learned from the Case Law of the European 
Court of Human Rights, 28 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 863 (2015). 
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Court’s core documents.  An example of this trend can be found in 
the judgment of the Appeals Chamber on the appeal of Mr. 
Thomas Lubanga Dylio against conviction.162  When considering 
the “control of the crime theory”163 of participation that had been 
applied by the Pre-Trial and Trial Chambers, the Appeals Chamber 
stressed that the doctrine was being referred to in the interpretation 
of the relevant provision of the Rome Statute, rather than as an 
independent source of law: 
 
As regards the argument that this approach was first developed 
in domestic legal doctrine, which is, as such, not applicable at 
the Court, the Appeals Chamber would like to clarify that it is 
not proposing to apply a particular legal doctrine or theory as a 
source of law.  Rather, it is interpreting and applying article 
25(3)(a) of the Statute.  In doing so, the Appeals Chamber 
considers it appropriate to seek guidance from approaches 
developed in other jurisdictions . . . .164 
 
The tendency of the judges to focus on the interpretation of the 
Rome Statute rather than the incorporation of external rules and 
principles into the Court’s applicable law may, at first sight, 
appear to reflect a conservative institution–one that is committed 
to the application of the carefully negotiated provisions of the 
Rome Statute, which States have endorsed through signature and 
ratification.  However, in practice, the Court’s approach disguises 
a rather liberal approach to the influence of external case law.  By 
emphasizing interpretation over gap filling, the judges have 
avoided scrutinizing the applicability of external sources under 
Article 21(1)(b) and (c) of the Rome Statute, and have, 
consequently, created scope for drawing from external 
jurisprudence that is not reflective of customary international law 
or general principles in the interpretation of the Court’s statutory 
text. 
The failure of the Court’s judges to situate references to 
external case law in the ICC’s rules of applicable law and 
interpretation has implications beyond adherence to a framework 
 
 162 See Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-3121, Judgment on the appeal of 
Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against his conviction (Dec. 1, 2014). 
 163 Id. ¶ 457 
 164 Id. ¶ 470. 
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of secondary rules under Franck’s theory of legitimacy.  The 
Court’s approach also has implications for the requirement of 
determinacy, i.e. its ability to “convey a clear message . . . .”165  
Decisions that are made to clarify ambiguity in “primary” rules of 
obligation are also subject to the requirements of legitimacy.166  
The Court’s decisions, and the process by which they are arrived, 
must also, therefore, be clear.  Failure to explain the legal basis for 
referring to and drawing from external case law reduces the clarity 
of the Court’s reasoning and, with it, the legitimacy of the Court 
and its applicable law. 
C. Fairness 
The ICC’s approach to external jurisprudence in the Lubanga 
case also has implications for the fairness of the Court’s 
proceedings.  Fairness is now widely recognized as an essential 
attribute of international criminal justice,167 and one that has also 
been linked to the legitimacy of international criminal tribunals.168  
The Rome Statute, as with the constitutive instruments of other 
international criminal tribunals, requires the Court’s proceedings 
to be fair.  The right of the accused to a fair hearing is enshrined in 
Article 67 and, under Article 64, the Trial Chamber is obliged to 
“ensure that a trial is fair and expeditious and is conducted with 
full respect for the rights of the accused . . .”169 
Judicial cross-referencing can affect the fairness of the ICC’s 
proceedings by supporting the development of the Court’s 
substantive or procedural law in a manner that infringes on the 
rights of the accused.  A key concern is the potential for external 
jurisprudence to be used to justify or support expansive 
interpretations of the ICC’s crimes and modes of liability in a 
manner that conflicts with the principle of nullum crimen sine 
lege, which protects the accused from being held accountable for 
 
 165 Franck, supra note 150, at 713. 
 166 See id. at 752. 
 167 In relation to the ICTY, see U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-
General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of the Security Council Resolution 808, ¶ 106, 
S/25704 (May 3, 1993) (noting “[i]t is axiomatic that the International Tribunal must 
fully respect internationally recognized standards regarding the rights of the accused at 
all stages of its proceedings”). 
 168 Jacob Katz Cogan, International Criminal Courts and Fair Trials: Difficulties 
and Prospects, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 111, 113-14 (2002). 
 169 Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 64. 
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conduct that was not criminal at the time of commission.170  
Robinson has highlighted the impact of human rights law on the 
development of substantive international criminal law, arguing that 
the transfer of techniques and methods of reasoning from the field 
of human rights law, which have evolved to increase the protection 
that is afforded to victims of human rights abuses, can challenge 
liberal principles of criminal justice by supporting expansive 
interpretations of international criminal law, which may be 
detrimental to the rights of the accused.171 
It is not only reference to case law from regional human rights 
courts that raises concerns about compliance with the principle of 
nullum crimen sine lege.  Reference to the case law of other 
international criminal courts and tribunals could raise similar 
issues where the law being applied exceeds the scope of liability 
outlined in the Rome Statute, or where judges of other institutions 
have taken expansive interpretations of equivalent norms.  In the 
context of the ICC, questions arise about the desirability of 
drawing from case law of the ad hoc tribunals that has been 
criticized for taking an expansive approach to the identification of 
customary international law.172  The practice of judicial cross-
referencing has been understood to have transformative potential 
in the sense that decisions that were “formally wrong” when 
initially rendered can develop into law over time if repeated by 
other courts or tribunals without being contested by States.173  In 
the interim period, however, reliance on them is likely to raise 
concerns about compliance with the rights of the accused. 
There are few indications in the Lubanga case law that external 
jurisprudence has been used to prioritize the interests of victims 
and the wider international community over the rights of the 
accused.  One area where reference to external case law can be 
seen to have supported expansive reasoning is in the interpretation 
of the Court’s prohibition on the use of child soldiers as a war 
crime.  Case law from the SCSL was referred to by the Trial 
Chamber when interpreting the scope of the phrase “using them to 
 
 170 Id. at art. 22. 
 171 See Darryl Robinson, The Identity Crisis of Int’l Crim. L., 21 LEIDEN J. OF INT’L 
L. 925 (2010). 
 172 See Lunbanga supra Section 2. 
 173 Cesare P. R. Romano, Deciphering the Grammar of the Int’l Jurisprudential 
Dialogue, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 755, 770 (2009). 
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participate actively in hostilities . . .” in Article 8(2)(e)(vii) of the 
Rome Statute and in supporting an interpretation that allowed a 
wide range of activities and roles to be covered.174 
What is more concerning about the ICC’s approach to external 
case law in the Lubanga case is the lack of clarity in the Court’s 
reasoning, which creates an environment that supports progressive 
development of the law.  Failure to explore the legal basis for 
referring to and drawing from external case law has the potential 
to disguise the incorporation of rules, principles and reasoning that 
expand the scope of criminal liability at the ICC. It also can raise 
issues of compliance with the principle of nullum crimen sine lege 
by elevating the significance of domestic or regional case law or 
relying on articulations of general principles or customary 
international law that have a weak legal basis.175 
The potential for judicial cross-referencing to disguise 
progressive reasoning is exacerbated by the reluctance of the 
ICC’s judges to indicate the weight that they have given external 
case law in their decisions in the Lubanga case.  Often the only 
evidence of reference to external jurisprudence is a simple 
footnote with a citation to the relevant decision(s).  The lack of 
reasoning makes it difficult to determine whether external case law 
has been the basis of the Court’s assessment of the law on a 
particular point or to retrospectively endorse or justify a 
conclusion arrived at on other grounds. 
The lack of clarity in the Court’s reasoning is not only 
detrimental to the fairness of the Court’s proceedings insofar as it 
supports the progressive development of the law to the detriment 
of the accused, it also makes it more difficult for the defense—and 
other parties and participants to the proceedings—to understand 
and challenge the reasoning of the Court and to anticipate the 
approach that might be taken to similar issues in future cases.  In 
this respect, the Court’s approach raises questions about the 
Court’s compliance with the requirement in Articles 74 and 83 of 
the Rome Statute that the Chambers provide a reasoned decision.  
 
 174 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 
of the Statute, ¶¶ 624-28 (Mar. 14, 2012). 
 175 Borda has also observed that international criminal courts and tribunals “rely 
heavily – at times exclusively – on legal findings of external judicial decisions, with little 
or no effort to conduct a first-hand examination of the rule of law in question.” Borda, 
supra note 10Error! Bookmark not defined., at 295. 
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Article 74 provides that decisions of the Trial Chamber must 
“contain a full and reasoned statement of the Trial Chamber’s 
findings on the evidence and conclusions.”176  Article 83(3) 
provides that the judgment of the Appeals Chamber “shall state the 
reasons on which it is based.”177  While the language of Article 74 
suggests that the provision relates only to the Trial Chamber’s 
final decisions on guilt or innocence of the accused,178 it has been 
argued to apply mutatis mutandis to other decisions of the Court.179 
The judges of the ICC and the ad hoc tribunals have 
interpreted the requirement of a reasoned decision to demand that 
the Chamber explains, with sufficient clarity, the basis of its 
decision.180  A key question in the present context is whether or not 
the duty to give reasons requires the Chamber to provide detailed 
reasoning on the significance and weight given to external 
jurisprudence under the ICC’s rules of applicable law and 
interpretation when explaining the basis for its decision.  The 
objective of Article 74 has been understood to be to make 
decisions of the Court understandable and acceptable, and to allow 
the parties to proceedings to exercise their right to appeal.181  It 
would be consistent with this purpose to require that judges 
explain the influence that external case law has had on their 
decision-making.  This is particularly important where the ICC’s 
decisions contain reasoning that may be considered progressive 
and in tension with the principle of nullum crimen sine lege. 
 
 176 Rome Statute, supra note 1Error! Bookmark not defined., at Art. 74 (5). 
 177 Id. at Art. 83(3). 
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D. Cultural Bias 
Finally, the ICC’s engagement with external case law has the 
potential to raise concerns about cultural bias in the Court’s 
applicable law and to undermine the perception of the ICC as an 
international institution that is capable of representing different 
cultural and legal values and traditions.182 
The ability of the ICC to reflect and represent different cultural 
and legal traditions is crucial to widespread State support and, in 
turn, the Court’s effectiveness.  In the absence of a referral from 
the UN Security Council, the ICC’s jurisdiction is dependent on a 
connection with a State Party to the Rome Statute or a State 
willing to accept the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction in relation 
to its territory or nationals.183  Widespread ratification of the Rome 
Statute is, therefore, vital to the ICC’s successful operation and an 
ongoing challenge for the Court.  The ICC also depends heavily on 
the cooperation of States in its proceedings in a variety of ways, 
from the arrest and surrender of suspects to the protection of 
victims and witnesses and the preservation of evidence.184  Again, 
this requires widespread support from State Parties, as well as non-
State Parties, to the Rome Statute. 
The aspiration of geographical representation at the ICC is 
reflected in the provisions of the Rome Statute.185  It is most 
apparent in the text of Article 36 of the Statute, which requires 
State Parties to take equitable geographical representation within 
the membership of the Court into account when selecting the 
ICC’s judges.186  However, geographical representation is also 
reflected in more discrete ways within the provisions of the Rome 
Statute.  As a result of the multinational treaty negotiations that 
preceded the adoption of the Rome Statute, influences from 
different cultures and traditions, and the political interests of 
different groups of States, can be found throughout the statutory 
text.187  As already noted, the ICC’s procedural regime combines 
elements of domestic legal traditions to a degree that is 
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unprecedented in the statutes of its predecessors. 
Judicial cross-referencing has the potential to interfere with the 
ICC’s ability to represent different cultures and traditions if 
disproportionate weight is given to the case law of certain regional 
or domestic jurisdictions.188  This could have a negative impact on 
State support, particularly during a time when the ICC’s 
investigations have focused heavily on the African continent,189 
stoking concerns about Western bias.190  It also has significance in 
light of wider concerns about Western bias in the identification of 
international law, in particular the tendency of courts to “focus 
primarily on Western State practice” in the identification of 
international custom and general principles of law.191  The result of 
this practice is the generation—or perpetuation—of a body of law 
that fails to reflect the diversity of actors that it seeks to regulate, 
and to prioritize the interests of some States over others, with 
implications for its compliance pull.192  In the international 
criminal context, attention has already been drawn to the tendency 
of the judges of the ad hoc tribunals to “emphasize the common-
law and civil-law traditions with which they are familiar, to the 
exclusion of other world legal systems such as Sharia, Hindu law 
or African customary law,” despite acknowledgement that they 
“should be inspired by the main world legal systems.”193 
One of the most striking trends in the content analysis of the 
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ICC’s decisions in the Lubanga case is the number of references to 
the case law of regional human rights courts, and to the ECtHR in 
particular.  While the ECtHR applies internationally recognized 
norms, the European Convention on Human Rights contains 
regional idiosyncrasies and has been interpreted in a manner that 
reflects European values and concerns.  The frequency of 
reference to the ECtHR in the Lubanga case indicates that 
European values and interests are disproportionately influencing 
the law the ICC is applying in the early stages of its development, 
raising concerns about cultural bias.  Against the backdrop of 
concerns about Western bias, it is significant that case law from 
the ECtHR was cited roughly twice as frequently as case law from 
the IACtHR.  The tendency to prioritize case law from European 
(or European-focused) institutions over others is also reflected in 
the disparity in the frequency of reference to the ICTY (106) and 
the ICTR (52). 
Another issue lies in the range of domestic courts that were 
referred to in the Lubanga proceedings.  The case law that the 
judges referred to emanates from just ten domestic legal systems, 
the majority of which are Western and follow the common law 
legal tradition.194  The impact of drawing from a small range of 
domestic jurisdictions is, again, to permit the values and concerns 
of a small number of States to have a disproportionate impact on 
the case law of the ICC and to introduce an element of bias into 
the Court’s applicable law.  Because of its “dual function” in 
international law, as evidence of State practice in the identification 
of custom and general principles, and as a subsidiary means of 
determining international law, domestic case law is susceptible to 
being upgraded or downgraded in the Court’s reasoning in an 
arbitrary manner.195  The absence of clear reasoning situating the 
references in the ICC’s rules of applicable law and interpretation, 
and explaining their weight, serves to disguise this process and any 
bias that may result from it. 
Justifications, or at least explanations, can be advanced for 
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disparities in the number of references to different bodies of 
external case law.  It is justifiable that the ICC’s judges will refer 
more frequently to institutions that have produced case law that is 
of greater relevance to the issues that it has been called upon to 
address.  The case law of some domestic and regional courts is 
likely to be more relevant than others, particularly given the range 
of issues that they have considered and the parallels that can be 
drawn between their legal frameworks and that of the ICC.196  The 
ICC’s procedural framework is, for example, closer to a common 
law than a civil law model, despite influences from both legal 
traditions.197  Case law from common law legal systems will, 
consequently, be more relevant on certain procedural issues that 
the Court comes to address.  It is also understandable, and perhaps 
inevitable, that judges and other Court staff, will refer more readily 
to decisions that they are familiar with, either because of their 
accessibility or familiarity with the institutions that have produced 
them. 
The most problematic aspect of the Court’s approach is, again, 
the lack of reasoning that the judges have provided in referring to 
external case law, in particular the unwillingness of the judges to 
distinguish the weight that is accorded to decisions from 
international, regional, and domestic institutions.  A rare exception 
is found on the Appeal Chamber’s decision on reparations, where 
the judges rejected a requirement drawn from a decision of the 
ECCC on the basis that it was “set out in Cambodia’s Code of 
Criminal Procedure and is thus not indicative of a ‘definite trend’ 
in international law.”198  In the majority of decisions, international, 
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regional and domestic case law has been referred to 
interchangeably, and appears to have been accorded similar 
weight.  This practice is supported by the reluctance of the ICC’s 
judges to scrutinize the relative weight of external case law under 
the ICC’s rules of applicable law and interpretation by 
determining, for example, whether or not a domestic practice 
reflects a general principle of law.  The effect of the practice is to 
allow the case law of certain regional and domestic institutions to 
have a disproportionate influence on the law of the ICC, and to 
fuel concerns about cultural bias. 
While more detailed reasoning may not affect the frequency 
with which the case law of certain regional or domestic courts are 
referred to, it would provide greater transparency as to how the 
Court arrives at its decisions and provide a basis to challenge the 
Court’s approach. 
VI.  Addressing Issues of Legitimacy, Fairness, and 
Cultural Bias 
The sections above have shown that judicial cross-referencing 
feeds into several aspects of the Court’s identity.  While it can be 
viewed positively from the perspective of the coherence of 
international law, it raises concerns about the Court’s legitimacy, 
fairness, and cultural bias. 
The starting point in remedying these concerns is for the 
judges of the ICC to situate their reference to external 
jurisprudence in the ICC’s rules of applicable law and 
interpretation.199  This requires the judges to grapple with several 
uncertainties that were left unresolved by the drafters of the Rome 
Statute.  They will need to explain the relationship between 
judicial cross-referencing and the ICC’s rules of interpretation, 
including those outlined in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (1969); to clarify the nature and scope of the sources 
outlined in Article 21(1)(b) and (c) of the Rome Statute, and the 
role of external jurisprudence in their identification; and to shed 
light on how “internationally recognized human rights,” referred to 
in Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute are identified, the role of 
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external jurisprudence in the process, and the relationship between 
those rights and the sources of law outlined in Article 21(1) of the 
Rome Statute.200 
In addition, the judges of the ICC must also explain the weight 
that has been given to any case law they refer to by indicating, 
where it is not otherwise apparent, if the decisions have provided 
the basis for the Court’s reasoning or merely serve to reinforce 
conclusions that have been reached on other grounds.  Together, 
these measures would help to respond to the aforementioned 
concerns of legitimacy, fairness and cultural bias by indicating a 
clear basis for the Court’s decisions.  It would also provide an 
opportunity to challenge those decisions, particularly when undue 
weight has been given to regional or domestic case law, or where 
the incorporation of reasoning from elsewhere serves to expand 
the jurisdiction of the ICC or threaten the rights of the accused. 
Where reference to external case law supports an interpretation 
that expands the scope of liability at the ICC to the detriment of 
the accused, the Court’s judges must not only be careful to explain 
the legal basis for their decision, but also to reconcile it with the 
principle of nullum crimen sine lege, set out in Article 22 of the 
Rome Statute.201 
The purpose of this article is not to suggest how the judges of 
the ICC should reconcile judicial cross-referencing with the 
Court’s rules of applicable law and interpretation, other than to 
highlight the importance of distinguishing international, regional, 
and domestic case law in doing so.  Rather, the aim is to highlight 
the importance of clear judicial reasoning when grappling with 
these issues in order to enhance the Court’s legitimacy, increase 
the fairness of its proceedings, and reduce the scope for cultural 
bias in the Court’s applicable law. 
While judicial reasoning is key to addressing the issues raised 
above, the concerns that were raised in relation to cultural bias 
have wider policy implications.  They also support calls for greater 
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efforts to be made to ensure geographical representation in the 
staffing of the Court.  This is due to the likelihood that judges will 
draw from jurisdictions they are familiar with.  The link between 
the background of the judge and the case law that they cite is 
apparent in the Lubanga jurisprudence.  The references to Cypriot 
case law can, for example, be traced to the contribution of Judge 
Pikis, the Cypriot judge, who, during the Lubanga proceedings, sat 
in the Appeals Chamber of the ICC.202  The breadth of jurisdictions 
from which judges draw is likely to be influenced not only by their 
familiarity with other bodies of case law, but also their ability to 
understand the language in which they are written or the context in 
which they arise.203  Concerns have been raised, for example, 
about the ability of non-Muslim judges at the ICC to comprehend 
and be sensitive to Shari’a principles in their decision-making.204  
Diversity in the staffing of the ICC is necessary in order to support 
accurate references to case law from a wide range of institutions. 
As already noted, Article 36(8) of the Rome Statute requires 
that State Parties consider representation of the principal legal 
systems of the world and equitable geographical representation in 
the selection of judges.205  Article 44 of the Rome Statute 
addresses staff appointed by the Prosecution and Registry, who 
may be engaged in legal analysis and assessments of the relevance 
of external case law that feed into submissions to the Chambers 
and, in turn, judicial decisions.206  Paragraph 2 requires that, in the 
employment of staff, the Prosecutor and Registrar “shall have 
regard, mutatis mutandis, to the criteria set forth in article 36, 
paragraph 8.’”207  In doing so, it incorporates the consideration of 
geographical representation into wider staffing decisions within 
the Court.  The requirement that geographical representation be 
considered in staffing decisions at the Court is also reflected in 
Resolution ICC-ASP/1/Res.10 of the Assembly of States Parties 
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on the Selection of Staff at the International Criminal Court,208 as 
well as the Staff Regulations proposed by the Registrar and 
adopted by the ICC Assembly of States Parties in accordance with 
Article 44(3) of the Rome Statute.209  The Staff Regulations 
provide that “the broad principles of personnel policy for the 
staffing and administration of the Registry . . . the Presidency, the 
Chambers and the Office of the Prosecutor.”210 
Despite the above, concerns have been raised about the 
achievement of geographical representation at the ICC.  In his 
commentary on the Rome Statute, Schabas has described the 
geographical distribution of professionals working at the Court as 
“an area where the Court not only suffers from a ‘chronic 
imbalance,’ but where the situation seems to be deteriorating 
rather than improving.”211  The imbalance is “in disfavour of 
countries and regions, in particular from Asia-Pacific and Latin 
American (sic) and the Caribbean.”212  He notes that “not only did 
the proportion of staff from Western European and other group[s] 
increase significantly from 2009 to 2015, by about 4 per cent, its 
dominance at the senior D-1 and P-5 levels increased even more, 
from 64.5 to 73 per cent of the total . . . .”213  In annual reports to 
the Assembly of States Parties, the Bureau to the Assembly of 
States Parties has acknowledged continuing issues with the 
achievement of equitable geographic representation and gender 
balance in the recruitment of staff to the ICC.214  Despite its 
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recommendations to the Court and to the Assembly of States 
Parties, the issue continues to be a live one for the ICC and an area 
where further work is needed. 
Concerns about the impact of judicial cross-referencing on 
cultural bias in the Court’s applicable law also raise the issue of 
the accessibility of external case law.  Even if judges are not 
obstructed by issues of language or the ability to comprehend the 
case law from other jurisdictions, their willingness and ability to 
draw from it is likely to be affected by how easy it is to access and 
search, particularly in light of ongoing pressure for efficiency in 
the Court’s proceedings.  Variation in the accessibility of different 
bodies of case law, again, feeds concerns about Western bias, 
given that the case law of some States is more accessible than 
others.215  As international courts and tribunals have proliferated, 
efforts have been made to increase the accessibility of case law 
through the availability of searchable online databases.  The ICC’s 
own range of Legal Tools includes databases containing a wide 
array of international, regional and domestic decisions.  The 
maintenance and development of the Legal Tools is overseen by a 
number of actors that are external to the Court and reliant on 
external funding to support their activities.216  The  willingness of 
States to invest in developing the Legal Tools is crucial to increase 
the diversity of searchable sources that can be easily accessed by 
staff within the ICC as well as staff working in other international 
criminal justice mechanisms. 
Together, provision of detailed judicial reasoning, efforts to 
improve geographical representation within the Court, and 
investment in tools that increase the accessibility of international 
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case law will enable the ICC to engage with external case law and 
contribute to the coherence of international law, while avoiding the 
negative implications of the practice for the Court’s legitimacy, 
fairness, and cultural bias. 
VII. Conclusion 
The ICC’s first case reflects a Court that is not operating in 
isolation, but as part of a large network of institutions that have 
been tasked with addressing similar legal issues.  The ICC’s 
judges have turned to external case law frequently, and it has been 
used to inform their decisions on a wide range of substantive and 
procedural issues.  The Court’s approach has developed despite the 
absence of a provision expressly requiring the judges to refer to 
external jurisprudence under Article 21 of the Rome Statute. 
The Court’s approach to external jurisprudence in the Lubanga 
case sheds light on several aspects of the Court’s identity.  First, it 
reveals a Court that is viewed from within as part of a wider 
corpus of international law, which extends beyond the field of 
international criminal law.  Judicial cross-referencing has helped 
to promote coherence in the corpus of international law at a time 
of potential fragmentation.  Even where the text of the Rome 
Statute or the function of the ICC has necessitated departures from 
external case law, the judges of the ICC have considered its 
content and relevance under the Court’s statutory framework.  In 
doing so, they have contributed to the overall integrity and 
coherence of international (criminal) law, with positive 
implications for its clarity, fairness, and effectiveness. 
The Lubanga case law does, however, have negative 
implications for other aspects of the ICC’s identity, namely its 
legitimacy, fairness, and cultural bias.  The concerns stem largely 
from the failure of the ICC’s judges to situate their references to 
external case law within the ICC’s rules of applicable law and 
interpretation, and to explain the weight that has been accorded to 
it in their reasoning.  Lack of reasoning creates a disconnect 
between the practice of judicial cross-referencing and the ICC’s 
legal framework, threatening the legitimacy of the ICC.  It creates 
uncertainty and has the potential to mask expansive reasoning to 
the detriment of the accused.  It also serves as a cover for the 
upgrading of regional and domestic case law in a manner that can 
encourage cultural bias in the Court’s applicable law. 
The solution to the above lies primarily in the willingness of 
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the judges of the ICC to explain the legal basis for referring to 
external jurisprudence and the weight that it has been given—
reasoning that will result in greater transparency and provide a 
basis to challenge the Court’s decisions.  Concerns about the 
connection between judicial cross-referencing and cultural bias in 
the Court’s applicable law also support ongoing calls to enhance 
geographical representation within the ICC and efforts to increase 
the accessibility of external case law, both of which require 
cooperation and support from actors outside of the ICC. 
While the tendency of courts to become more inward looking 
and self-referential over time has been highlighted elsewhere,217 
external case law will continue to provide a useful source of 
reference where the ICC is called upon to address novel legal 
issues.  The willingness of the Court’s judges to look beyond the 
ICC’s own case law and to engage in the practice of judicial cross-
referencing will become increasingly important in future years as 
the ICC continues to operate against the backdrop of an ever-
evolving body of international law.  The measures proposed in this 
article will, therefore, continue to be pertinent beyond the ICC’s 
early cases. 
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